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Abstract 
This report presents the design and implementation of an analog wireless channel emulator to 
examine various denial of service attacks in multiple mobile scenarios.  The scenarios emulated 
in this project involve three node topologies of wireless interferers (Wi-Fi radios), including a 
software defined radio that transmits one of three denial of service (DoS) waveforms. The 
testbed was functional and met the original specifications. Results from mobile experiments 
show a clear distinction in performance among the three DoS waveforms depending on the node 
topology; a digital waveform using binary phase shift keying (BPSK) is most effective at 
reducing total network throughput at close range while sweep waveforms exhibit minor 
throughput reduction from a greater distance.   
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Executive Summary 
Emergency response and communications during a major disaster have become increasingly 
important over the past decade.  In cases such as the L.A. earthquake in 1994, the earthquake and 
tsunami in Indonesia, or Hurricane Katrina, the communications infrastructure was overwhelmed 
[1] and prevented local law enforcement and emergency personnel from coordinating rescues 
and conveying vital information [2].  The damage to the network is not always physical; often 
there is major disruption from network congestion [3].  Many networks are not designed to 
handle high volumes and the powerful human need to communicate during a disaster can 
overwhelm even the most sophisticated networks [4]. 
The FCC sponsors emergency communication systems such as the Nationwide Wireless Priority 
Service (WPS) that allows emergency telephone calls to avoid network congestion, and the 
Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS).  However, the effectiveness of 
these systems has been questioned [6], and the FCC has recently allocated portions of its Public 
Safety spectrum for shared commercial use [7].  If these resources become unavailable during a 
crisis, emergency responders may prefer to use high-speed wireless internet services [5] which 
are equally subject to network congestion.  A standard resolution of how emergency responders 
and local law enforcement may clear the channel for high-priority use has not yet been proposed.   
There is currently not enough exclusive spectrum for emergency responders to reliably 
communicate during a crisis.  Additionally, recent laws regulating public safety spectrum for 
commercial use suggest it may be especially vulnerable to congestion.  For these reasons it is 
critical for emergency personnel to have the capacity to silence interfering emitters during 
disasters so that appropriate response measures may be coordinated.  Experimenting with and 
validating denial of service techniques over open air-waves could potentially disrupt user 
services and violate FCC regulations.   
A controllable test platform is needed to investigate the reallocation of spectrum resources in a 
contested communications environment. The team designed, built, and calibrated a testbed for 
this purpose.  Several key specifications were determined early on to ensure that the testbed met 
current and future testing needs. 
  
 
 Wideband: 2-8GHz Bandwidth 
 4-Node Support: three interfering nodes and one emergency responder 
 Motion Emulation: real time emulation of changing nodal geometries 
 Computer control : for  analog channel emulator and radio hardware 
A concept diagram of the testbed is shown in Figure 1.  The testbed features an analog RF 
channel emulator (Yellow) which emulates mobility of radio nodes via programmable 
attenuators.  Radio hardware includes three miniature computers equipped with Wi-Fi 802.11b/g 
radios (Blue) and a software defined radio called a Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP, 
Red).  The entire system, including the channel emulator, radio nodes, and USRP, is computer 
controlled. 
 
Figure 1: Testbed Concept Diagram.  Real-time Analog RF Channel Emulator (Yellow).  Wireless Interferers (Blue).  Emergency 
Responder (Red).   
The testbed enables emulation of different mobile scenarios in a controlled laboratory setting.  
For the purpose of this project, the team was interested in scenarios involving a single emergency 
responder node (the USRP) moving through a cluster of interfering emitters (the three Wi-Fi 
radios) . The RF channel emulator allowed the team to experiment with several different denial 
of service (DoS) techniques implemented by the emergency responder node. These different 
methods were analyzed for effectiveness, efficiency, and overall performance.   
  
 
In order to ensure that the testbed met specifications and was representative of a time-varying RF 
channel, the team conducted a variety of tests on the parts and the system as a whole. S-
parameters were measured across the band for each part. Switching speed was measured for the 
attenuators. When the testbed was assembled, loss was measured throughout the system for each 
of the twelve possible routes through the system and calibrated to make sure that variation 
between those routes was minimal. A photograph of the assemble system is shown below in 
Figure 4.   
  
Figure 4: Assembled Testbed.  Wi-Fi Radios & USRP (Left), Real-time Analog RF Channel Emulator (Middle), Computer Based 
Control (Right).  All components are controlled through one central computer (not shown). 
To further confirm that the testbed would produce reasonable results, measurements taken on a 
stationary two node network, similar to one described in the literature [7], were compared to 
measurements taken on the four radio testbed.  Comparing the four node team testbed with the 
previously described two radio configuration served as a verification and validation of the 
procedures and equipment used during the course of this project.  Results from this comparison 
are shown in Figure 3.  
 
  
 
 
Figure 3: Verification and Validation: Comparison of Throughput vs. SWR between Two Node Testbed (Top) and Four Node 
Testbed with Channel Emulator (Bottom).  Both testbed results are comparable to published research [7]. 
The experiment in Figure 3 (top) was designed to mimic an experiment from published research; 
it examines the effect of modulated waveforms on throughput where two nodes exchange traffic 
while one node injects a waveform with variable power.  In this case, the waveform is binary 
phase shift keying (BPSK); increasing the signal to waveform ratio (SWR) will decrease 
throughput as shown in Figure 3.  This test was repeated on the four node testbed; all values 
correlate with results from the two radio network within a small margin of error and serve as a 
validation of testbed operation.   
Once the testbed had been built, tested, and validated, a series of three mobile node scenarios, 
along with three different denial of service waveforms, were selected for investigation on the 
testbed. Each waveform was implemented on each of the three mobile scenarios. For simplicity, 
wireless nodes were made stationary while the emergency responder traversed a straight path at a 
constant velocity.   The three different denial of service waveforms include digital, pulse, and 
sweep. Figure 5 displays the results of one experimental mobile scenario repeated for each denial 
of service waveforms;  (A) displays total network throughput over time when subject to a 
  
 
jammer waveform, (B) illustrates the position of each stationary node with the start and stop 
location of the emergency responder. 
 
Figure 5: Comparison of performance among different jamming techniques in a mobile, Equidistant node topology. Graph of 
Total Network Throughput vs. Time of Digital, Pulse, and Sweep jamming (Left). Coordinate Grid (Right) of Wireless 
interferers (Blue) and Emergency Responder (Red) start and stop location. 
According to the results in Figure 5 the team was able to conclude that digital jamming (Purple) 
is the most optimal technique at close range in this node topology, while sweep jamming (Green) 
is suited for long range, indicated by the premature drop in throughput and late recovery in (A).   
For all of the different jamming waveforms, throughput is at the lowest when the emergency 
responder node enters the cluster of interfering emitters and improves as it moves away. 
In the process of completing this project, a few critical areas were identified for improvement 
and future consideration, including the robustness of the testbed setup, different mobile 
scenarios, and potentially more effective and efficient denial of service attacks.  Expanding the 
testbed to support as many as six nodes and widening the bandwidth down to 30MHz could 
increase the value of the channel emulator as a test asset. An FPGA could also be used to 
produce more accurate digital signals to control the attenuators in a more reliable way.  In terms 
of the denial of service attack, an investigation into the performance of MAC layer waveforms or 
  
 
“Protocol” techniques may point toward an attractive, efficient substitute to the power 
consuming RF or PHY layer waveforms.  Continuing to develop and improve denial of service 
techniques could enable emergency responders to more effectively communicate during a crisis.  
In summary, all specifications for the RF channel emulator were met. The testbed allowed the 
team to conduct several experiments that investigated the performance of various denial of 
service waveforms used by an emergency responder against wireless interferers in an emulated 
mobile environment.   
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Emergency response and communications during a major disaster have become increasingly 
important over the past decade.  In cases such as the L.A. earthquake in 1994, the earthquake and 
tsunami in Indonesia, or in Hurricane Katrina, the communications infrastructure was 
overwhelmed [1] and prevented local law enforcement and emergency personnel from 
coordinating rescues and conveying vital information [2].  The damage to the network is not 
always physical; often there is major disruption from network congestion [3].  Many networks 
are not designed to handle high volumes and are approaching their maximum capacity; growth in 
mobile video traffic is expected to double within the next 2 years [8], and the powerful human 
need to communicate during a disaster can overwhelm even the most sophisticated networks [4]. 
Crisis readiness is becoming increasingly important as communication technologies become 
more complex, interdependent, and vulnerable [9].  Although damage to physical network 
infrastructures may be unavoidable, network congestion can be just as detrimental [4], [10], [11].  
Creating fully resilient networks is nearly impossible with evolving technologies, protocols, and 
the rapid increase in usage and demand for high speed internet and mobile video services.  
Communications is not only important during a disaster, but after; the internet in particular 
provides a backbone for financial and banking operations to support the recovery of local 
communities [12].   
The FCC sponsors emergency communication systems such as the Nationwide Wireless Priority 
Service (WPS) that allows emergency telephone calls to avoid network congestion, and the 
Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS).  However, the effectiveness of 
these systems has been questioned [5], and the FCC has recently allocated portions of its Public 
Safety spectrum for shared commercial use [6].  If these resources become unavailable during a 
crisis, emergency responders may prefer to use high-speed wireless internet services [4] which 
are equally subject to network congestion.  A standard resolution of how emergency responders 
and local law enforcement may clear the channel for high-priority use has not yet been proposed.   
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In this paper we introduce the problems of network congestion facing the future of 
communications during a crisis and the availability of this resource to emergency responders.  
Our team presents a prototype testbed, including a real-time channel emulator, and focuses on 
demonstrating a practical solution to network congestion in an emulated, mobile environment 
using commercial 802.11 Wi-Fi devices and programmable radios. 
1.2 Problem Statements 
There is currently not enough exclusive spectrum for emergency responders to reliably 
communicate during a crisis.  Popularity and demand in wireless communication has surged in 
recent years, increasing susceptibility to network congestion.  Additionally, recent laws 
regulating public safety spectrum for commercial use suggest it may be especially vulnerable to 
congestion. This problem presents a key question that frames our project: 
How can we efficiently and effectively clear network congestion to reallocate the spectrum for 
emergency responders?  
In order to address this question, we examine the solution space for ownership in a contested 
communications environment. 
1.3 Proposed Solution  
Our team proposes a denial of service (DoS) technique that is capable of removing Wi-Fi 
interferers from the channel so that authorized personnel can regain this resource. If effective, 
this method could be used by emergency responders to efficiently and effectively clear congested 
networks to re-establish communications by authorized personnel.  However, experimenting with 
and validating this technique across open air-waves would disrupt user services and violate FCC 
regulations; thus a computer controlled testbed, including a real-time RF channel emulator that 
uses commercially available Wi-Fi radios and a Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP), 
will be designed for this purpose.  The basic structure of this testbed solution is shown in Figure 
1. 
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Figure 1: Proposed solution, computer controlled RF testbed with real-time channel emulation, Universal Software Radio 
Peripheral (USRP) and commercially available Wi-Fi Radios 
The task of (1) developing a technique to clear channel bandwidth, and (2) creating an analog 
channel emulator to validate that technique, was divided into several key deliverables. These 
deliverables are composed of thresholds and objectives. Thresholds represent the most 
fundamental accomplishments that the team will deliver upon completion of the project. 
Objectives are milestones that the team will achieve only once the thresholds have been 
accomplished, time permitting. The thresholds and objectives target both the channel emulator 
and the Wi-Fi DoS portion of the project. The thresholds and objectives, as they pertain to the 
two main areas of focus, are shown in Table 1. 
As displayed in Table 1, the most basic requirements for the channel emulator included: support 
for 2 to 8GHz of bandwidth, variable attenuators to simulate changing geometries, and support 
for four radio nodes.  It was required that this channel emulator be built and tested by completion 
of the project. Time allowing, this channel emulator could have been scaled up to support six 
radios on a 30MHz to 8GHz bandwidth.  Testing of the channel emulator components and the 
assembled system was required to validate the channel emulator.  
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Table 1: Project deliverables are divided into thresholds and objectives. Deliverables pertain to both the channel emulator 
and the Wi-Fi DoS portions of the project 
 Thresholds Objectives 
Channel Emulator Support for 4 nodes. Support for 6 nodes. 
Wideband (2-8GHz). Coverage for 30MHz to 8GHz. 
Real-time (variable attenuator to simulate 
changing nodal geometries). 
 
Wi-Fi DoS Attack Validate the channel emulator by 
repeating existing Wi-Fi attacks. 
 “Reactive Beacon Frame Injection” 
attack in the MAC layer. 
Examine results of the same Wi-Fi attacks 
using different mobile scenarios. 
 
 
In order to meet threshold requirements in the Wi-Fi Denial of Service (DoS) portion of the 
project, known PHY (Physical) layer jamming techniques were repeated and documented, first 
on a simple two radio network for validation, then on the channel emulator.  Repeating known 
attacks and validating consistency in the results was an important way to ensure functionality in 
the channel emulator.  Once the accuracy of the testbed had been confirmed, the mobility feature 
of the channel emulator was used to repeat the same PHY layer attacks in three different mobile 
configurations of nodes.  Lastly, the team did preliminary testing of a MAC (Medium Access 
Control) layer attack on the testbed.  The proposed MAC layer attack was called “Reactive 
Beacon Frame Injection”, where beacon frames were injected with false information, intended to 
disrupt transmissions between other clients.   
1.4 Report Organization  
This report will document background information pertaining to the project topic, the process 
and methods, and subsequently the results, discussion, the conclusion.  Chapter two will be an 
overview of RF channels, wireless networks, and Wi-Fi security.  The important attributes of an 
RF channel and different ways that these characteristics have been recreated in various types of 
channel emulators will be covered.  In addition, wireless network basics and Wi-Fi protocol and 
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security will be outlined.  Chapter 3 will detail the methods used to design, build, and test the 
analog channel emulator along with the techniques for both PHY and MAC layer jamming.  
Finally, the results of the group’s measurements on the testbed, PHY layer jamming, and the 
Reactive Beacon Frame Injection will be presented in chapter 4, discussed in chapter 5, and put 
into context in chapter 6. 
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2 Overview of RF Channels,  
Wireless Networks, and Security 
In order to successfully build an analog RF channel emulator and demonstrate a DoS attack, 
background research was necessary in many areas.  Our team isolated several key areas for 
further investigation.  In particular, the team was interested in the different characteristics that 
define realistic RF channels and how these conditions can be, and have been, recreated in 
different types of channel emulators and testbeds.  The ability to create a realistic analog channel 
emulator depends upon a thorough understanding of the RF channel and how it has been 
emulated by researchers in the past.  An in-depth knowledge of Wi-Fi, in particular the MAC and 
PHY layers of IEEE 802.11, is instrumental in isolating and exploiting any weaknesses.  In order 
to create a new DoS attack, the team also conducted a literature review of different types of Wi-
Fi denial of service attacks that have already been tested.  This chapter will review these topics 
as they pertain to our project goals. 
2.1 The RF Channel 
In an ideal world, transmitted RF power would arrive at the receiver unscathed.  In reality, the 
signal is scaled, delayed, and distorted in a variety of ways.  Understanding all of the factors that 
can impact signal integrity is crucial to successful radio communications.  Being able to emulate 
and recreate some of these characteristics and effects to allow for accurate testing is of equal 
importance.  This section describes the basic attributes of an RF channel and then reviews some 
of the different techniques for recreating these conditions for wireless network testing. 
Important aspects of RF channel  
An RF channel describes the path between a transmitter and a receiver.  In an ‘ideal’ channel, the 
signal is the same at the receiver as it is at the transmitter with the exception of a small delay and 
attenuation.  However, this model of a channel neglects some of the many other types of 
interferences and distortions that could alter or corrupt the signal on its way the receiver [13, p. 
11].  Some of these impairments include multipath, signal fading, and various noise sources.  
Figure 2 shows one channel model that includes some of the different types of distortion and 
interference. 
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Figure 2: Channel model considering sources of interference [13]. This model includes a scaled and delayed signal, multipath 
fading, narrowband noises and broadband noises. 
Free space path loss 
In the real world, radios communicating over different distances experience varying amounts of 
attenuation based upon their physical separation.  Radios that are located within a small distance 
of each other are subject to less attenuation while radios that are positioned greater distances 
from each other face greater amounts of attenuation.  Free Space Path Loss (FSPL) is the 
attenuation of signal power with increased distance between transmitter (TX) and receiver (RX) 
due to the spreading of the signal over a greater area [14, pp. 129-131].  Free space path loss 
does not take into account diffraction (the spreading or bending of waves in the presence of 
obstacles) or reflection (change in propagation direction due to encountering a different 
medium).  Free space path loss is also the ratio of transmit power (  ) over power received (  ): 
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attenuation has to do with the spreading of electromagnetic energy through space with increased 
distance.  The frequency dependency, however, does not actually arise from path loss effects.  
Instead, this correlation has to do with the receiving antenna’s ability to collect electromagnetic 
energy.  Assuming constant transmit power, greater values of   correspond to greater values of  
  
  
 which in turn reflects larger amounts of loss or attenuation between transmitting and receiving 
radios.  Rewriting this equation in terms of decibels, we get: 
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Note that these equations do not take into account the antenna gain.  For a setup with a 
transmitting antenna gain    and a receiving antenna gain   , the free space path loss is given 
by: 
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where    is the effective area of the transmitting antenna while    is the effective area of the 
receiving antenna.  Expressed as a decibel value: 
                   (  )           (    ) (2.4) 
This equation implies that at greater distances the signal experiences greater attenuation.  
Without antenna gains to compensate, radios communicating at higher frequencies also 
experience greater attenuation. 
Multipath 
Multipath arises from differing path lengths that result from reflections off of interfering 
obstacles located between the transmitter and receiver.  Reflections of varying magnitude take 
different paths that correspond to slightly different arrival times resulting in either reinforcement 
or cancellation of the signal at the receiver.  Figure 3 displays the concept of differing path 
lengths from the same source to receiver due to collision with reflective surfaces.  The delays 
and signal magnitude associated with each of the paths in the diagram will determine, to some 
extent, the quality of the signal received at receiver. 
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Figure 3: Obstacles cause electromagnetic waves to reflect and travel different paths of varying lengths. The Red path, path 
1, is the line of site path while the Blue path, path 2, is the result of reflected signal power. Signal power traveling path two 
travels a greater distance and thus experiences greater delay. The sum of the power from both paths is a signal that is 
distorted due to multipath effects. 
In the case of the diagram shown above, the signal power at the receiver is composed of power 
from the line of site path (path 1) and power from the reflected path (path 2).  The graph to the 
right shows what the waveforms might look like at the receiver.  Because power travelling path 2 
(Blue) travels a greater distance, it arrives at the receiver some time delay    after signal power 
traveling along path 1 (Red) arrives.  As a result, the sum of the two received signals (Green) is a 
slightly distorted version of the original signal.  This scenario displays the concept of multipath, 
but in reality, many more paths can exist creating even greater distortion.  The signal at the 
receiver in any given time can be expressed as the sum of the scaled and delayed reflections 
arriving at the receiving radio [13, p. 62].  If s(t) represents the transmitted signal then the 
received signal rx(t) is given by: 
   ( )      (    )      (    )         (    ) (2.5) 
where    is the magnitude of the signal    is the time delay, and N is the total number of delays.  
Physically, this means that the received signal, as shown in Figure 2Figure 3, is composed of not 
only the power from the line of site propagation but also signal power from any reflected path 
that might exist.  Electromagnetic energy propagating along the reflected paths arrive some time 
delay    after the line of site propagation arrives.  This time delay is based upon the length of the 
path traveled.  Summing all of the different scaled and delayed reflections that arrive at the 
receiver can result in a signal that is distorted to some degree.  If this distortion is severe enough, 
it can interfere with signal integrity.  
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Noise 
There are a variety of ways that noise can be introduced in a channel.  Types of noise can 
generally be divided into two types: narrowband and broadband.  Noises that occupy a very 
small range of frequencies constitute narrowband noises while noises that span a large range of 
frequencies are broadband noises.  Other transmitters utilizing the same channel are one possible 
source of narrowband noise.  When narrowband noises exist outside the frequency band of 
interest, they can be filtered out relatively easily, but when they are in-band, they pose more of a 
challenge.  Broadband noises can come from a variety of sources including thermal noise and 
atmospheric sources. 
Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) refers to wideband noise that exists at a constant 
spectral density with amplitude determined by a Gaussian distribution.  The spectral density of 
AWGN is given in units of power per hertz of bandwidth.  One type of AWGN is thermal noise, 
cause by tiny random motions of electrons [13].  This type of temperature dependent noise exists 
in any electrical component as well as in all transmission media [14, pp. 86-87].  The thermal 
noise power N [W], that exists in bandwidth B [Hz], in any given component is given by  
       (  )       (2.6) 
where    [
 
   
]  is the noise power density and k is Boltzmann’s constant.  Because thermal 
noise is inherent in any media and component and cannot be completely removed, it is a 
fundamental limitation of communication systems. 
Impulse noise is a potentially broadband, sudden, form of interference.  Impulse noise can come 
from a variety of sources that are often located within the proximity of an RF system.  Some 
possible sources of impulse noise are car ignitions, poor insulation on high voltage lines, and 
lightning [15].  As shown in Figure 2, these different types of noise are combined with the signal 
additively.   
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Figure 4: (A) Noiseless time domain 60Hz signal. (B) Noiseless 60 Hz frequency domain signal. (C) 60 Hz time domain signal 
with AWGN (Blue) and noiseless 60Hz time domain signal.  (D) Noisy 60 Hz signal in the frequency domain, the noise floor is 
shown in red. 
Figure 4 (A) shows a 60 Hz time domain signal without any type of distortion or noise added to 
it.  This same signal is shown in Figure 4 (B) in the frequency domain, with the signal power 
concentrated at and around 60 Hz.  Figure 4 (C) is the same 60 Hz time domain signal, this time 
with AWGN.  The red trace shows the original unaltered signal while the blue signal shows the 
signal with AWGN.  In the frequency domain [Figure 4 (D)] this noisy signal still has the 
majority of its power located at 60 Hz, however there is noise power located at other frequencies 
as well.  The sum of all unwanted signal power and noise is the noise floor, shown in red in 
Figure 4 (D).  
Creating experimental channel conditions 
In order to examine the functionality of different types of wireless networks and the impacts of 
varying certain network parameters, experimenters need to be able to reliably create and/or 
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control certain channel conditions.  Different techniques exist to allow for wireless network 
testing in an experimental channel.  These include software based channel simulation, channel 
emulators, wireless radio testbeds, and wired testbeds.  These different test environments 
perform differently in terms of experiment repeatability, ease and extent of control, adaptability, 
and cost [16].  For the purpose of this report, ‘channel emulator’ refers to a system where radios 
remain stationary while radio signals are altered to simulate a RF channel changing with time 
[17, p. 3].  
Software simulation 
Software based channel simulators can model a variety of different channel conditions.  While 
channel simulators can be adapted widely to a wide array of different types of experiments, they 
are limited in their ability to accurately replicate the complexity of a channel.  According to 
experimenters at the University of Colorado Boulder, software simulations offer relatively good 
estimation results but fall short when it comes to accurately representing the physical layer [18].  
They can sometimes also neglect communication between different layers of the protocol.  In 
their work, these authors have noticed specific inconsistencies between simulation and hardware 
results.  
Ray tracing is one simulation technique that is commonly used in software based simulation.  As 
electromagnetic waves propagate through a wireless channel, they can encounter certain 
environmental characteristics and objects that cause the wave to change direction.  Ray tracing is 
a method that approximates the traveling wave as a set of small ‘rays’ that travel in a straight 
lines across small sections of distance.  Each ray is moved in a straight line over that small 
distance and then the direction of propagation is calculated again for the next small section.  For 
a radio channel, this method can be used for simulating the effects of multipath.  For an isotropic 
source, for example, radiation could be modeled as a large amount of rays coming directly out of 
the source.  When one of these rays encounters a reflective surface, it changes direction 
accordingly.  The sum of rays that arrive at the receiver at any given time is the resulting 
distorted signal.  While software based simulation is extremely useful for some types of testing, 
testbeds that connect to actual radio hardware offer additional accuracy in the PHY layer. 
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Wireless testbeds 
In the real world, radios generally communicate over a given distance, through air, using 
antennas.  This real world scenario is shown in the top part of Figure 5.  Testing radios in this 
type of setting requires large amounts of space and is often complicated, difficult to control, and 
not very repeatable.  Furthermore, proper permissions need to be obtained from the FCC in order 
to use certain bandwidths at certain broadcast powers.  For this reason, this type of testing is not 
always feasible and alternatives in a controlled laboratory setting are needed.  In the context of 
this report, wireless radio testbeds refer to testbeds that involve an arrangement of nodes where 
physical antennas remain as part of the system.  This is an important distinction from wired 
testbeds where antennas are removed and replaced with coaxial cables.  Both types of testbeds 
along with the real world scenario that they represent are portrayed in Figure 5.  Real world 
distances can be mimicked in a much smaller laboratory environment by placing attenuators 
between the output of the radio and the antennas as shown in the middle section of Figure 5.  
This causes the magnitude of the transmitted and received signal to be smaller, as it would be if 
the radios were communicating over a greater distance.   
`  
Figure 5: The real world radio communications scenario, shown on top, can be modeled using a wireless, miniaturized, 
configuration with attenuators (middle). The concept of a wired testbed is at the bottom of the image. A wired testbed 
involves radios that are connected to each other using coaxial cable and RF components, like the attenuator shown, to model 
channel response. 
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The channel can be further modified by introducing noise generators [19].  Noise generators, or 
‘noise bricks’, give experimenters another degree of control over the channel that is being 
emulated.  An RF noise generator is shown below in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Noise generators can be used to add noise to a channel emulator. This noise generator, or ‘noise brick’, is 
manufactured by Noisecom Incorporated. 
While wireless testbeds can sometimes create useful and realistic experimental conditions, 
implementing them comes with some unique challenges, such as achieving repeatability [20].  
Fading and external sources of interference tend to vary with time and are extremely difficult to 
control, even in the laboratory.  In some wireless testbeds, system mobility can be achieved only 
through actually physically moving nodes.  For example, the Miniaturized Wireless Network 
Testbed (MiNT), created by researchers at Stony Brook University, achieves node mobility by 
mounting nodes on iRobot’s Roomba, a vacuum cleaning robot. 
One of the better known wireless network testbeds is the Open Access Research Testbed for 
Next-Generation Wireless Networks (ORBIT), located at Rutgers University.  This testbed is 
accessible to members of the research community who can write their own code to run custom 
experiments remotely on the radio grid.  ORBIT currently houses 400 radio nodes indoors.  A 
picture of some of these nodes is in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: The indoor testing facility at Rutgers University [21] is open for use to members of the research community who 
write their own code. Each yellow box is one of 400 stationary radio nodes. 
Despite the impressive utility of ORBIT, it does not exist without limitation.  For example, all 
nodes in ORBIT are stationary.  For this reason, the only way to change network topology is by 
either including or excluding specific nodes from the configuration.  Orbit also faces the same 
challenges as any other wireless testbed in terms of controlling experiment reproducibility. 
A smaller scale and less expensive testbed called The Emulated Wireless Ad Hoc Network 
Testbed (EWANT) was created at the University of Colorado at Boulder [18].  This testbed is 
significantly scaled down in size and is capable of simulating node mobility.  Attenuators 
situated between antennas and Wi-Fi cards allow a large scale setup to exist in a much smaller 
location.  In order to create mobility, the RF signal is multiplexed four ways and terminated in 
four separate antennas.  A switch enables selection between the four unique antenna outputs.  
The antennas in EWANT are arranged in different configuration on a metallic tabletop with 
holes as shown in Figure 8.  Antennas can be moved to different holes to represent different node 
geometries. 
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Figure 8: In the EWANT testbed, antennas can be rearranged on metallic table top with holes to create unique geometries. 
By switching between antennas, mobility can be emulated. 
 Because each radio is connected to a switch that can select from one of four differently placed 
antennas, limited mobility can be emulated.  When the switch selects a different transmitting 
antenna, it is as if the radio has ‘moved’, albeit rather suddenly. 
Wired Testbeds 
Wired testbed configurations generally involve physically connecting radios with a network of 
coax cables and a combination of passive and active components that create realistic and 
controllable channel conditions.  The key benefit to wired testbeds is their repeatability.  Unlike 
wireless testbeds, where many of the external conditions are difficult to control, wired testbeds 
exist in a smaller, much more controllable, and thus far more repeatable environment.  Despite 
the high costs of creating an adaptable wired testbed, they can offer a repeatable and realistic test 
setting. 
One interesting realization of a wired channel emulator was created by engineers in Queensland 
Laboratory in Australia.  With this particular implementation, ten programmable signal 
attenuators, power splitter/combiners, and coaxial cables, connect up to five wireless nodes [19].  
Different attenuation levels are programmed using a national instrument PCI card.  The authors 
varied the nature of the ‘channel’ by changing attenuation setting in the ten attenuators.  A 
diagram from their paper is in Figure 9.  Radio nodes are represented in blue and attenuators in 
red.  Black lines indicate connectivity.  In this configuration, changing the attenuation value 
between any pair of nodes changes the emulated ‘distance’ between them.  Greater attenuation 
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values correspond to greater distances while smaller attenuation values emulate radios within 
close proximity of each other.  By varying the attenuation values between all of the nodes 
simultaneously, the creators of this system mimic the changing geometry of a system of nodes, 
all moving with respect to one another. 
 
Figure 9: The connectivity of a wired testbed created at Queensland Laboratory in Australia supports up to 5 nodes [19]. The 
cannel response is created by programmable attenuators placed between radios, shown in red. 
A similar testbed, called MeshTest, was created by the Laboratory for Telecommunications 
Sciences to support as many as twelve nodes [20].  Researchers who created this testbed used an 
RF matrix switches to route and attenuate signals between the different nodes.  An example of a 
3 x 3 RF matrix switch is shown in Figure 10, with three inputs, three outputs, and nine 
attenuators.  
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Figure 10: 3 x 3 RF Matrix Switch [22]. Inputs are split three ways, scaled using programmable attenuators, and recombined 
so that each output receives power from each of the three inputs. 
The RF matrix switch shown in Figure 10 works by splitting the power from each input three 
ways.  Each RF path is then connected to a programmable attenuator and power from each of the 
three inputs is combined into each of the three outputs using a 3-way divider to combine the 
signals.  The programmable attenuators allow the user to control the magnitude of each input at 
each of the three outputs.  In MeshTest, this configuration allows the user to control the signal 
power between all of the radio pairs. 
For this type of connectivity, the number of attenuators needed is equivalent to the number of 
inputs multiplied by the number of outputs.  For MeshTest, programmable attenuators supported 
attenuation values from 0-127dB.  According to authors, the values programmed into the 
attenuators can be expressed in a matrix  , where the number of rows and columns is the same as 
the number of nodes.  The multiplicative attenuation from node i to node j is given by element 
     in the matrix  .  Different values in matrix L represent different physical configurations and 
distances between radios in the channel.  Adjusting the attenuator values rapidly can mimic 
channel conditions for a mobile group of nodes.  To increase usability, creators of this testbed 
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developed a GUI that allows the user to define starting, interim, and ending locations for the 
nodes as well as certain timing intricacies.  
A second class of wired channel emulators utilize FPGA based signal processing rather than 
programmable attenuators to emulate motion and to mimic more complicated channel conditions.  
These types of channel emulators can model multipath, fading, as well as path loss.  Radios that 
comprise a network under test are plugged directly into this device.  The RF signal from each of 
these nodes is then downconverted and sampled by an ADC.  The resulting signals are then sent 
to a channel simulating FPGA board where signals can be attenuated, filtered, and combined.  
Finally, the signals pass through a DAC, are upconverted, and sent to recipient radios.  The CMU 
Wireless Emulator is one example of this type of channel emulator from academia [23].  This 
emulator is capable of supporting up to 15 nodes with 210 independent channels.  In this case, 
the channel simulator board is a Virtex 2 Pro FPGA.  This emulator is somewhat similar to the 
commercially available Elektrobit Propsim F32 channel emulator shown in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11: Elektrobit Propsim F32, radio channel emulator [24]. The F32 model has the capacity to support as many as 32 
distinct RF channels with 16 bidirectional nodes. This channel emulator can also emulate fading. 
This emulator has the capacity for up to 32 distinct RF channels, supports 16 bidirectional nodes, 
and offers up to 128 fading channels.  Operating frequency range for the Propsim is 30 to 
2700MHz with a signal bandwidth of up to 40MHz.  All of the different types of channel 
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emulators and testbeds discussed in this section, including the Elektrobit Propsim, are 
summarized in Table 2 [17]. 
Table 2: Comparison of different channel emulators and testbeds. Testbeds can be wired or wireless and include a variety of 
different mechanisms for motion emulation.  
Name Mobility 
Mechanism 
Wireless 
or 
Wired 
Maximum 
Number of 
Nodes 
Wireless Medium 
Modeling 
MiNT (Miniaturized 
Wireless Network Testbed) 
Robots 
(iRobot’s 
Roomba) 
Wireless 8 IEEE 802.11 
ORBIT (Open-access 
Research Testbed for Next-
Generation Wireless 
Networks) 
Antenna 
switching 
Wireless 400  IEEE 802.11, 
Bluetooth, 
EWANT (Emulated 
Wireless Ad-hoc Network 
Testbed) 
Antenna 
switching 
Wireless 4 IEEE 802.11 
MeshTest (Laboratory-based 
wireless testbed for large 
topologies) 
Programmable 
attenuators 
Wired 12 IEEE 802.11 
Queensland Lab Testbed 
(For wireless mesh networks 
[13]) 
Programmable 
attenuators 
Wired 5 IEEE 802.11 
CMU Wireless Emulator FPGA channel 
simulator board 
Wired 15 (210 
independent 
channels) 
IEEE 802.11 
(2.4GHz, 90MHz 
BW) 
Elektrobit Propsim F32 FPGA Wired 16 (128 fading 
channels) 
30 to 2700MHz  
(40MHz BW) 
 21 
In summary, the testbeds reviewed were either wired (connected by RF components and coax) or 
wireless (transmitting over air using antennas).  Wireless testbeds can be miniaturized using 
attenuators, but they still use antennas to communicate, such as the MiNT, EWANT and ORBIT 
testbeds.  Wired testbeds replace antennas with coaxial cables and other RF hardware that 
mimics certain channel conditions, as in the MeshTest, Queensland Lab, CMU emulator, and the 
Elektrobit Propsim testbeds.  A variety of different techniques, including robots, antenna 
switching, and programmable attenuators can be used to emulate a changing geometry of radio 
nodes.  These testbeds offer a platform for testing different aspects of wireless communications 
and security.   
2.2 Wireless Communication & Security 
This section will cover a small portion of the broad field of communications, more specifically, 
the IEEE 802.11b and 802.11g wireless standards.  By popular demand, Wi-Fi has seen 
explosive growth over the past 15 years, so much that developers have had a difficult time 
anticipating problems in security.  The first wireless security & encryption protocol built in 1999 
(WEP, or Wired Equivalent Privacy), was publicly compromised only 2 years later [25] and 
subsequently deprecated with the replacement WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) in 2002, leading 
to the now prevalent WPA2 in 2004 [26].  As this paper may show, staying ahead of the curve of 
wireless security is a complex and difficult process; predicting and accounting for every possible 
weakness is nearly impossible. 
Brief Tutorial in Wireless Communications and 802.11b/g 
Communication between computers requires an agreed upon architecture and protocol.  The ISO 
(International Standard Organization) developed the OSI (Open System Interconnection 
Architecture) to support development and operation of communications.  Figure 12 illustrates the 
OSI protocol stack.  
Breaking up the protocol into separate layers simplifies each operation.  Devices can specialize 
in one layer while ignoring details on lower layers.  Each subsequent layer facilitates the transfer 
of information to other programs, computers, or networks.  It helps to imagine network protocols 
as stripping off (or adding back) layers of an onion.  For example, when sending an e-mail, the 
application layer would be responsible for identifying the sender and receiver.  After the 
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presentation layer encodes the data with ASCII characters (or the specified coding scheme), a 
session may be initiated (by the Session layer) where a conversation between two computers is 
opened.   
 
Figure 12: Open System Interconnection Architecture (OSI) Protocol Stack, a product of the International Organization for 
Standardization for characterizing layers of communication systems [27]. 
The message would then get divided into a TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) packet by the 
Transport layer, which ensures end-to-end delivery.  The Network layer then adds network 
addressing and routing information in order to open and maintain network connections.  Access 
and control of the medium is negotiated by the Data Link layer.  Finally, the Physical layer then 
modulates the data into a bit stream that is transferred over the medium to another client. 
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The IEEE 802 standard, built upon the OSI model, provided a framework for wireless 
communication, which requires a slightly modified protocol to account for mobility and security.  
Motivation for wireless communication standards began in the 1980’s to support factory 
environments [28].  The IEEE 802.11 standard became the first and only WLAN (Wireless Local 
Area Network) standard to successfully secure a market.  This 2,500 page document specifies the 
protocol for PHY (Physical: RF and modulation schemes) and MAC (Medium Access Control) 
layers of a communication architecture.   
The main objectives of the 802.11 standard were to provide a mechanism that could allow 
overlapping networks, include conditions that handle interference from radios and microwave 
ovens, eliminate “hidden terminal” problems, support time-bounded services, and maintain 
privacy and secure access [28].  Table 10 in the Appendix lists 802.11 standards and their scope.  
The following list describes layers implemented in the 802.11 protocol stack [14]: 
 Upper layers are not defined in 802.11 and are assumed to use the IEEE 802 standard, or 
the network’s supported variation, consisting of Internet, Transport, and Application 
layers.   
o The Application layer transfers information specific to an application such as 
websites (HTTP), file transfers (FTP), e-mail (SMTP/IMAP/POP), and secure 
logins/connections (SSH, Telnet).  Many varieties of TCP/IP protocols 
implemented in the application layer exist, including NFS (Network File System), 
and WHOIS (remote directory access). 
o The Transport layer provides error and flow control with ensured delivery, using 
TCP and UDP (User Datagram Protocol).  TCP messages constitute the majority 
of information sent over applications such as email and websites, while video and 
other streaming information typically utilize UDP. 
o The Network layer uses IPv4 or IPv6 and provides ICMP (Ping), and packet 
forwarding and routing.  Host addressing (IP address) and resolution also 
included.  Note that IP datagrams do not require acknowledgments, which are 
implemented in the Transport layer or Data Link layer. 
 24 
 The Data Link layer is the logical interface to network hardware including the MAC 
layer.  Channel access, coordination, and reliable data delivery are key components to 
this layer, explained in more detail in the MAC Layer section. 
 The Physical layer is responsible for modulating and representing signals over a 
medium.  In 802.11b/g, this layer modulates bits into Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum 
(DSSS) at 5.5 & 11 Mbps or Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) at up 
to 54 Mbps, respectively.  This layer is explained further in the following section. 
The 802.11 standard only specifies operation within the MAC and PHY layer.  The MAC layer is 
divided into two sublayers: the MAC sublayer controls roaming access, power management, and 
connection management, and the MAC-Management sublayer provides an access mechanism 
and reassembles packets.  The PHY layer contains three sublayers: PHY Layer Convergence 
Protocol (PLCP), used for carrier sensing and packet formation, PHY Medium Dependent 
Protocol (PMD), used to specify modulation and coding, and PHY Layer Management Sublayer, 
used to control channel tuning and similar options [28]. 
PHY Layer 
The Physical layer of the 802.11 protocol stack dictates the transmission of raw bits over a 
medium.  Each version of the 802.11 standard (a, b, etc., listed in Table 10) includes variations 
of PHY layer implementations and technologies.  These modulation schemes have their own 
advantages and disadvantages in certain environments.  
Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) is a modulation technique used in 802.11b which 
spreads each bit of a signal into smaller pulses using a spreading code.  This technique sacrifices 
bandwidth (data rate) by spreading information out in frequency, which increases performance 
against narrowband noise and multipath propagation [28].  The spread bits are then modulated 
and transmitted across a medium, shown in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13: Input and Output using spread sequence (sequence shown is called Barker code), The Data bit is transformed into 
Spread bits using the spread sequence. 
The spreading code used in 802.11 is called the Barker code, which is also shown as the example 
sequence in Figure 13.  It has low cross-correlation properties, allowing a more uniform 
spectrum and increased performance against noise [29].  At 1 Mbps, each bit is spread into an 
eleven ‘chip’ sequence, which is then modulated using Differential Binary Phase Shift Keying 
(DBPSK), as in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14: Map of Barker Code Sequence at 1 Mbit/sec with DBPSK [29].  Each bit is modified by an 11-bit sequence. 
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Data sent at 2 Mbps is possible using Differential Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (DQPSK), 
which simply adds a 90° phase change to DBPSK.  Figure 15 illustrates the effect of a 
narrowband jammer on a DSSS signal before despreading. 
 
Figure 15: Amplitude of DSSS Signal (Blue) vs.  Narrowband Jammer (Red) before despreading [30].  Note: signals are 
simplified and do not represent actual DSSS or jamming signals. 
For demonstration purposes, the signals are over-simplified.  Figure 15 shows a narrowband 
interferer (jammer, Red) with much larger signal amplitude than the DSSS signal (Blue).  In 
some cases the DSSS signal is even beneath the noise floor, an ideal characteristic in covert 
military applications.  Figure 16 illustrates the effect of despreading both signals. 
 
Figure 16: Amplitude of DSSS Signal (Blue) vs.  Narrowband Jammer (Red) after despreading.  The Despread signal is now at 
higher amplitude than the jammer’s signal. 
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After despreading the signal, the jammer is minimized (the Barker code contributes to the 
efficiency of this operation).  The end result, after applying a band-pass filter in Figure 17, is a 
transmitted signal with much greater amplitude than the jammer, despite the difference in power.   
 
Figure 17: Amplitude of Original Signal (Blue) vs. Processed Jammer (Red) after applying a band-pass filter.  This is the overall 
result of using a DSSS modulation scheme against a narrowband interferer. 
This effect against jammers and avoidance to detection helps to explain why DSSS was first 
developed by the military.  It is worth noting that the military developed cryptographic 
techniques to deploy the spreading code, as an adversary with this knowledge could effectively 
jam the network by modulating their jammer with the spreading code [31]. 
Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM), used in 802.11g, enables higher 
throughput (up to 54Mbps).  OFDM does well against narrowband interference, frequency-
selective fading, and multi-path distortion, while maintaining high spectral efficiency.  To help 
illustrate the effectiveness of this technique, multipath fading and inter-symbol interference are 
described in the following paragraphs. 
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Figure 18: Multipath signals bouncing off the environment.  Signals suffer decay and arrive late at the receiver. 
Multipath fading is common in any real-world application of wireless communication.  The 
original transmitted signal (Red) will follow multiple paths (Green and Blue), bounce off the 
environment, and arrive at the receiver delayed in time and decayed in amplitude.  Figure 19 
shows the transmission of two signals at the transmitter (A), the ideal received signal (exactly the 
same as the transmitted signal, B), and the realistic scenario of multiple signals arriving at the 
receiver due to inter-symbol interference (C). 
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Figure 19: Transmitted Signal (A) with two symbols, Ideal Received Signal (B), Realistic Received Signal (C) with multiple, 
decayed, overlapping received symbols from ISI. 
In Figure 19 (C), the delayed received signal of the first bit (Green) overlaps into the second bit 
(Red), an effect called inter-symbol interference (ISI).  If the two signals were spaced far enough 
apart, their multipath equivalents would not affect the following signal.  This problem worsens 
when attempting high data-rate transmissions, as in Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20: Transmitted signal with high bit-rate transmission (low symbol duration) (Left).  Received signal with increased ISI 
(Right). 
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In order to squeeze more data into a shorter amount of time, the duration between each symbol is 
shortened.  This shortening causes the effects of inter-symbol interference to intensify, as the 
travel time of multipath signals does not change with data-rate.   
OFDM addresses this issue in a few ways; dividing carriers into sub-carriers with lower data 
rates, using guard intervals between bands and symbols, and the addition of cyclic prefixes.  
Figure 21 demonstrates the use of multiple carriers to send data. 
OFDM encodes data with low rates on multiple carrier frequencies.  This process diminishes 
intersymbol interference (ISI).  For example, when increasing the data rate, digital signals are 
modulated with shorter durations.  This makes them more susceptible to noise or other 
impairments.  However, dividing these carriers into subcarriers allows a high overall data rate 
while maintaining a low data rate per carrier.   
 
Figure 21: Using multiple carriers to send data (FDM).  Advantages: Increased data rate and resistance to ISI using guard 
bands.  Disadvantages: inefficient use of bandwidth. 
By dividing one channel into many, each individual channel can use a lower data rate, but will 
sum to the original, high-speed data rate.  The lower data rates imply longer durations between 
symbols and help to diminish ISI.  However, this model, also known as Frequency Division 
Multiplexing (FDM) is not bandwidth efficient.  The introduction of orthogonal frequencies 
allows a more efficient use of bandwidth. 
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Figure 22: Using overlapping carriers to send data (OFDM).  Advantages: greatly increased data rate, resistance to ISI using 
guard bands, and efficient use of bandwidth.  Disadvantages: sensitive to carrier frequency offset or drift. 
Figure 22 demonstrates efficient use of bandwidth using OFDM sub-carriers for each channel.  
IEEE 802.11a/g uses 52 sub-carriers (48 for data, 4 for pilot tones) [26].  This feature can be 
explained by first examining the Fourier transform of a simple square signal in time, shown in 
Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23: Fourier transform of square, time domain signal into Sinc pulse in frequency domain.  The bandwidth    is 
inversely related to the spacing   . 
A square signal in time is a     ( )  
   ( )
 
 function in frequency.  Sinc pulses will intersect at 
equally spaced points if they are spaced apart by   .  When utilizing this feature, each sub-
carrier is spaced such that, when sampled, it has no interference from the other frequencies.  
Figure 24 illustrates this orthogonality with multiple overlapping sinusoids. 
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Figure 24: N=5 Overlapping OFDM tones.  Each tone is orthogonal if the spacing between frequencies is equal to 1/NT.  Note: 
minimal interference at sampling points (multiples of the symbol rate). 
The symbol duration    is inversely related to the spacing   ; in other words, increasing the 
data rate (shortening   ) requires an increase in carrier spacing.  Hence, a trade-off exists 
between data rate and spectral efficiency (higher data rates require increased carrier spacing, 
consuming more bandwidth).   
These methods increase spectral efficiency, but inter-symbol interference is still an issue.  To 
reiterate the problem, consider Figure 25; it starts with the transmission of two symbols using 
DBPSK (Blue), with a faded multipath symbol (Red) indicating inter-symbol interference (gray). 
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Figure 25: Two received symbols using DBPSK (Blue).  Inter-Symbol Interference from multipath signal (Red). 
The specific interval of interference is highlighted in gray.  The multipath delay spread is a direct 
result of the environment and has nothing to do with modulation or symbol rate.  Therefore, the 
most direct solution would be to shift the next symbol back in time (delay) so that the multipath 
signal does not affect the next symbol.  This technique is implemented in Figure 26. 
 
Figure 26: Two received symbols using DBPSK (Blue) and multipath signals (Red).  The guard interval avoids Inter-Symbol 
Interference by delaying the start of the next symbol. 
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Notice that the next symbol does not start until the end of the multipath symbol, thus ISI has 
been eliminated.  However, an empty transmission in time is not technically applicable in most 
hardware (which outputs continuous signals) and could cause disruptions and desynchronization 
in the receiver.  A solution to this problem is to fill the guard interval with the tail of the symbol, 
depicted in Figure 27.   
 
Figure 27: Two received symbols using DBPSK (Solid Blue) with a Cyclic Prefix (Dashed Blue) added to avoid ISI.  The cyclic 
extension is taken from the tail end of the symbol and added to the front. 
This technique eliminates ISI by including a tail of the symbol to fill the guard interval, and 
allows the beginning of symbols to become corrupted without affecting demodulation.  Figure 28 
shows an alternative view of the transmitted symbol using cyclic extensions. 
 
Figure 28: Alternate view of the transmitted signal using Cyclic Prefix.  The received signal avoids ISI. 
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OFDM will typically use 0.8 µS for the cyclic prefix, based on the maximum delay spread of the 
environment, and not necessarily to every sub-carrier [26].  The one drawback with this method 
is the loss in data rate used to include the redundant information (the cyclic prefix).  OFDM is 
also implemented in the latest 802.11n standard with Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO), 
achieving longer range and increased data rates (up to 600 Mbps) via multiple antennas [32]. 
MAC Layer 
Nearly every form of wireless communication includes a MAC layer or protocol (Medium 
Access Control).  In wireless communication, only one person can talk at a time on the same 
channel.  The MAC Layer defines the rules on how clients share the channel equally while 
minimizing interference, in addition to accounting for reliable delivery and security.  In the most 
basic sense, the MAC layer is the protocol that dictates when and who gets to use the “talking 
stick.”  In Wi-Fi, this is implemented in two main fashions: a Distributed Coordinate Function 
(DCF), and a Point Coordinate Function (PCF, implemented on top of the DCF).  PCF is used in 
Access Point (AP) mode, where there exists a server or “leader” who takes control and organizes 
the network.  DCF is used in Ad-hoc mode, where there is no formal structure or leader and all 
users rely on a protocol of how to share the medium with each other.  A four node example of 
the two basic network configurations is shown in Figure 29. 
 
Figure 29: Differences between Access Point (Central Server or Point Coordination) and Ad-hoc Networks (Mesh or 
Distributed Coordination). 
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In each scenario in Figure 29, one node attempts to transmit (bottom left node).  In AP networks, 
the point coordinator (PCF) issues the NAV signal to all other nodes, allowing the one client to 
transmit.  The AP will also issue contention-free periods (NAV signals) to stop all other 
terminals and poll other stations in a semi-periodic fashion [28].  Ad-hoc networks rely on a set 
of rules to allow each user a fair chance at using the medium, and decide when to transmit and 
when to be silent based on those rules. 
At the heart of the DCF is the Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA) protocol.  This is a 
process by which the channel is sensed (virtually and physically) before attempting to transmit.  
A critical component of CSMA is a priority schema, where three different Inter-frame Spacings 
(IFS), described in Table 3, exist for different types of packets,  
Table 3: Definitions of Inter-frame Spacings and their role in the MAC Layer [14]. 
Name Definition 
IFS Inter-frame Spacing.  The amount of time to wait to transmit after the medium has been 
sensed as busy. 
SIFS Short IFS.  The shortest duration (highest priority) to wait to transmit.  This is used in 
Acknowledgement (ACK), Clear to Send (CTS), and Poll Response messages. 
PIFS Point Coordination Function IFS.  This is used in Access Point mode by the central 
controller when issuing polls or to take precedence over DIFS. 
DIFS Distributed Coordinate Function IFS.  The longest duration (lowest priority), used for all 
ordinary traffic. 
 
The IFS between transmissions allow specific packets to have priority over others.  The SIFS 
primarily allows some room for receivers to respond before others begin transmitting, such as 
when a receiver sends an ACK to confirm delivery to the transmitter, or when a receiver signals 
others that a transmission is about to begin (CTS).  The PIFS is used by an Access Point or 
“point coordinator” to maintain priority control of the channel.  All other traffic must wait the 
duration of DIFS before attempting to transmit.  Figure 30 demonstrates the use of IFS and a 
backoff window, explained in the following paragraph. 
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Figure 30: IEEE 802.11 MAC Access Method using Inter-frame Spacings and the Exponential Backoff Algorithm [14, p. 530]. 
If one or more radios transmit while the medium is busy, a collision can occur.  To reduce the 
probability of collisions and provide equal opportunity for transmission, each radio uses an 
exponential backoff algorithm.  The algorithm attempts to space out repeated transmissions in a 
populated network [28].  This involves choosing a random number and, while the medium is 
free, waiting that number of time slots before attempting to transmit.  If the medium is sensed as 
busy, the timer freezes until the channel is idle again.  Further collisions cause the timer to 
increase exponentially.   
As shown in Figure 30, after waiting DIFS, any client is allowed to transmit if the medium is 
free.  Once a transmission is detected, all clients activate their Network Allocation Vector (NAV, 
an indicator of a busy channel) signal for the duration of the transmission.  The receiving client 
will wait the duration of SIFS and return an ACK, CTS or Poll Response message if necessary.  
If an Access Points needs to take control of the medium after transmission, it will wait the 
duration of PIFS.  Other clients will wait the duration of DIFS before attempting to transmit.  At 
this point, if one client is unable to gain access to the medium or notices a collision with another 
client, it will begin counting its backoff timer while the medium is idle, then when the timer 
reaches zero it will attempt to retransmit.  A general overview of this process is shown in Figure 
31. 
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Figure 31: IEEE 802.11 Medium Access Control Logic [14, p. 528].  All clients will check the medium to see if it’s idle before 
attempting to transmit in order to avoid collisions. 
A client attempting to transmit will first check if the medium is being used.  If it is clear, it will 
wait one IFS and check the medium once more before transmitting a frame.  If the medium is 
busy, it will wait until the transmission ends (the duration is usually announced beforehand by 
the transmitting client), then it will wait one IFS before checking the medium again.  If the 
medium is still busy, it begins counting a random backoff counter. 
A common problem in early wireless technology was the “Hidden Node,” illustrated in Figure 
32.  Nodes A and B can communicate with each other, as well as B and C, but node A cannot 
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communicate with node C.  Both nodes A and C have no way of knowing if the other is 
transmitting, and if both transmit to node B at the same time, their transmissions will collide. 
 
Figure 32: Hidden Node Problem: Nodes A & C cannot hear each other and attempt to transmit to Node B at the same time, 
causing a collision in the receiver of Node B. 
The solution to this problem is Carrier Sense Multiple Access / Collision Avoidance 
(CSMA/CA).  This involves sending a “Request to Send” (RTS) and “Clear to Send” (CTS) 
notification before sending and receiving transmissions, shown in Figure 33.  In the above 
scenario, if node A attempts to transmit to node B, it first sends a RTS packet.  Then, if node B is 
available, it will send a CTS packet containing the duration of the transmission, giving 
permission for node A to continue.  Node C will then hear the CTS packet and wait until the end 
of the transmission. 
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Figure 33: Implementation of the RTS/CTS mechanism in 802.11 with NAV activation, SIFS/DIFS interval, and contention 
window [28, p. 462]. 
The 802.11 MAC layer also has a number of management/control fields to handle mobility, 
registration, power, and security.  Management and control frames are often the target of 
wireless attacks.  Wireless attacks on ad-hoc networks at the MAC layer partially stem from the 
problem of negotiating access to and control of the channel with users or clients that are not 
necessarily listed or pre-accounted for.  
Different types of jamming and attacks 
Jamming causes a disruption of communication between clients either by denying access or 
corrupting information.  Several types of attacks exist against the 802.11 framework.  Those 
pertaining to this experiment are divided into PHY and MAC categories and listed according to 
the general amount of intelligence required in Figure 34.  Most PHY layer jamming is an effect 
of raising the background (thermal) noise such that it effectively disrupts synchronization, 
tracking, and transmissions between clients [31]. 
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Figure 34: Jamming Attacks at MAC & PHY Layer.  Techniques are listed by intelligence required. 
A short list of PHY layer attacks (Table 4) consists of RF Jamming using noise (typically 
Additive White Gaussian Noise [AWGN]) as a sweep, random bursts or pulses, or even 
modulated data using Differential Binary Phase Shift Keying (DBPSK).  Modulated (deceptive) 
noise imitates a signal that contains information, often forcing the receiver to spend time and 
energy decoding the signal.  MAC layer attacks, listed in Table 5, are more complex and require 
some knowledge of the network.  Jamming methods at higher layers (MAC and above) typically 
require intelligence gathering before commencing an attack.  
Table 4: PHY Layer Jamming Definitions. 
Name Definition 
Constant Continuous jamming with AWGN. 
Sweep Continually jamming, typically with a single carrier tone, in a sweep pattern 
across a range of frequencies. 
Deceptive Modulating noise to appear as though it contains information. 
Random/Pulse Transmitting signals at random intervals to save power and avoid detection. 
Reactive/Corruption Jamming for short durations to destroy packets when a transmission is detected. 
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Each technique in Table 4 has its own advantages and disadvantages.  For example, constant 
jamming requires the most power, but will completely prevent communication in the target area, 
especially when using directed antennas.   Most PHY layer attacks do not discriminate between 
friends and foes, but MAC layer attacks have the potential to selectively target clients.  A short 
list of attacks relative to this report is defined in Table 5. 
Table 5: MAC Layer Jamming Definitions. 
Name Definition 
Deauthentication/Disassociation Spoof (fake) frames that force clients to disconnect from each other. 
Backoff Manipulation Fooling a receiver to increase the time spent waiting to avoid 
collisions. 
NAV Spoofing Cause other clients to wait until the channel is busy by sending fake 
CTS/RTS messages. 
Channel Switch Fooling or causing a transmitter to switch channels unnecessarily. 
De-synchronization Altering time stamps in management frames in order to cause de-
synchronization at the receiver. 
Flooding Sending many (thousands or more) of beacons or association requests 
in order to overflow the association table. 
Reactive Frame Injection Injecting malicious information into management frames on rate, 
encryption, channel, and association, immediately after the target’s 
frame. 
 
Unlike PHY layer jamming, the effectiveness and efficiency of MAC attacks vary depending on 
the protocol used by the target.  The techniques in Table 5 are specific to 802.11b/g, but can 
occasionally be applied to other existing protocols, which is why some ‘intelligence gathering’ is 
necessary with higher layer attacks.  One of the most effective techniques is a deauthentication or 
disassociation attack, which constantly spoofs frames that disconnect you from other nodes, 
making communication near impossible.  However, effectiveness does not always imply 
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efficiency, an important parameter in ad-hoc networks, as they are usually mobile and rely on 
battery power.  A chart which categorizes several of the above listed attacks is shown in Figure 
35.  Note that this chart is subjective generalized; any PHY jammer can be made 100% effective 
with enough power, and any MAC layer attack can prove more effective depending on the 
protocol and hardware used in the network. 
 
Figure 35: Chart of Effectiveness vs. Efficiency of PHY (RED) and MAC (BLUE) layer attacks.  Note: All attacks are subjective. 
PHY layer attacks are inherently more effective, as they prevent the most basic use of a medium, 
but are typically less efficient.  Constant jamming is the least efficient as it consumes the most 
power and involves unceasing transmission.  An exception is reactive jamming, which involves 
transmitting a small burst of noise when an on-going transmission has been detected, and is 
considered one of the most efficient methods of RF jamming.  Unlike some naïve PHY jamming 
techniques which are not very efficient (constant, sweep, random, pulse), MAC attacks have the 
potential to substantially decrease effective throughput using far less energy. 
NAV spoofing is slightly less efficient and effective since it has to repeatedly spoof CTS/RTS 
frames, and cannot destroy other packets.  We propose that the reactive frame injection method 
will be of the same efficiency of NAV spoofing, since it will transmit with similar periodicity.  
 44 
However, reactive frame injection could prove more effective than NAV spoofing, since it has 
the power to selectively silence communications, whereas NAV spoofing can only silence all 
clients in the area except one node.  
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3 Methods 
As previously discussed, this project is composed of two distinct, but closely related, parts: 
testbed construction and a Wi-Fi denial of service attack on that testbed.  Both components are 
equally important and dependent on each other.  The testbed provides a mechanism to test the 
team’s proposed MAC layer Wi-Fi attack while the well known PHY layer jamming attacks 
provide the team with a way to validate the testbed.  In this chapter, the team will explain the 
process of developing, executing, and testing/validating the different key components of this 
project.  This will include a description of the testbed design process and the techniques use to 
perform preliminary testing.  The team will also cover the techniques used to perform PHY layer 
jamming, starting off the testbed to create a point of comparison and then moving to the testbed 
to confirm testbed functionality.  Lastly, the team will discuss the development and execution of 
the MAC layer attack performed on the testbed. 
3.1 Channel Emulator Design Process 
Before settling on a final design for the channel emulator portion of the testbed, the team 
explored some preliminary ideas.  Ideas were based upon the original specifications provided to 
the team by mentors at MIT Lincoln Laboratory.  These specifications included: 
 Wideband (30MHz – 8GHz) 
 Support for 6 radio nodes 
 Isolation no less than 20dB between fingers of splitters 
 No more than 45dB of loss throughout the system  
 No more than 2dB of variation in loss between the different paths through the system 
 Attenuators switch within 1ms timing 
 
Although the original design ideas were not ultimately the chosen solutions, they played an 
important role in the design process.  Evaluating the pros and cons of these initial designs led the 
team to the final channel emulator design that best met specifications.  
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Original Design Ideas and Assessment 
Prior to commencing any detailed design, the team constructed a very basic outline of the 
channel emulator and its key components. Figure 36 below is a visual summary of the basic 
channel emulator structure with its most fundamental components. 
 
Figure 36: Basic structure of analog channel emulator with key parts (A) Circulator (B) Power Splitter/Combiner and (C) 
Programmable Attenuator. This diagram shows a channel emulator that supports only three radio nodes. 
This design schematic is a scaled down channel emulator that supports three radios, although the 
same concepts in this design can be scaled up to support more nodes.  In the schematic, each of 
the three radios is connected to a circulator, Figure 36 (a), which allows the radio to transmit and 
receive simultaneously.  The transmit path connects to a power splitter, Figure 36 (b), which 
divides the power from each radio three ways.  Two of the three RF paths created by the splitter 
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connect to a programmable attenuator, Figure 36 (c), which allows the user to control the 
magnitude of the signal sent from each radio to all of the other radios.  The remaining RF path, 
which does not connect to an attenuator, can either be terminated with a 50Ω load or can be sent 
to an oscilloscope or spectrum analyzer.   
A second set of three-way splitters recombine signal power from two of the radios and send it 
back to the receiving port of the circulator.  In summary, the fundamental channel emulator 
design was found to need three important key parts or functions: circulators to provide isolation 
between TX and RX, splitters/combiners, and programmable attenuation. 
With the important functions of the channel emulator determined, specific parts to perform these 
key functions were selected.  Because the specifications are for a six radio channel emulator, the 
splitters need to be six-way, unlike in Figure 36, where the splitters were three-way to support a 
three radio channel emulator.  Considering the specifications, the team put together two different 
lists of parts for two different design schemes.  Both designs use a Hittite Microwave 
programmable attenuator (HMC-C018) that works from DC to 13GHz and provides attenuation 
from 0 to 31.5dB in steps of 0.5dB.   
When programmed to the 0dB attenuation state, this attenuator has an insertion loss of 4dB.  
Both designs also involved a more narrowband circulator, on hand in the laboratory, which could 
be switched out for a more permanent wideband solution later on.  The design ideas differed in 
their implementation of the six-way splitter. 
The first design scheme creates the six way splitters out of one two-way resistive power splitter 
(Mini-Circuits ZFRSC-123+) cascaded with two three way splitters (Mini-Circuits SF3RSC-
542+).  A diagram of the composite six-way splitter is shown below in Figure 37. 
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Figure 37: Six-way splitter composed of cascaded two and three-way splitters. This design was not ultimately used because it 
was too lossy. 
Isolation between the fingers of the different splitters, as described on the data sheet, is shown in 
Figure 37.  The two-way splitter has an isolation of 18dB between fingers of the splitter while 
the three way splitter has isolation of 19.5dB.  While the isolation in this splitter is relatively 
close to the specifications, it is extremely lossy, with 10dB in each two-way splitter and 20dB in 
each three way splitter.  When a radio transmits, the power goes through the circulator, the 
cascaded splitters, back through a different set of cascaded splitters, and finally back through the 
circulator again.  The total loss due to travelling through the six way splitters alone is 60dB.  
This is far above the given 45dB specification for loss throughout the system.  In addition, the 6 
way splitter only supports a bandwidth of DC - 5.4GHz which falls short of the bandwidth 
specification. 
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The second design idea involved cascading five two-way power splitters (Mini-Circuits ZX10R-
14+) to create the six way splitter/combiner.  These splitters have less loss, specifically 7.5dB per 
two-way splitter and 45dB total for the two six-way splitters created by cascading them, but this 
is still too much.  
 
Figure 38: Five two-way splitters cascaded to create a six-way splitter. This design was not ultimately used because it did not 
provide enough isolation. 
While the second design idea supports the full specified band, the two way splitters only have 
6dB of isolation between the fingers of the splitters, as shown in Figure 38.  This is substantially 
lower than the specified isolation.  The limitations of these two original design ideas are 
summarized in Table 6.  
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Table 6: Design attempts for RF channel emulator. The two original design attempts did not meet specifications. 
 Specifications Design Attempt 1 Design Attempt 2 
Parts  1.  Programmable attenuator 
(Hittite HMC-C018) 
2.  Two-way power splitter 
(Mini-Circuits ZFRSC-123+) 
3.  Three-way power splitter 
(Mini-Circuits ZF3RSC-542+) 
4.  Circulator (RFLC-301-4) 
1.  Programmable attenuator 
(Hittite HMC-C018) 
2.  Two-way power splitter 
(Mini-Circuits ZX10R-14+) 
3.  Circulator (RFLC-301-4) 
Bandwidth 30MHz – 8GHz DC – 5.4GHz DC – 10GHz 
Isolation 20dB 18dB (minimum) 6dB 
Total System Loss 45dB 65dB 50dB 
 
In summary, the original ideas both failed to meet specifications.  The first design attempt had 
almost enough isolation but too much loss and did not cover the desired bandwidth.  The second 
design attempt contained less loss than the first plan but still too much, and, while it covered the 
full band, it had far too little isolation.  Learning from these first passes at the problem helped the 
team produce the final design. 
Final Design 
Due to the difficulty meeting the system specifications for such a wide bandwidth, the team 
decided to employ band breaks in the system.  Distinct sets of parts are used to support the lower 
and upper portions of the frequency band.  Based upon a review of available parts, the team 
decided to have the lower frequency band support 30MHz to 3GHz and the higher frequency 
band support 2 to 8GHz, with an overlap from 2 to 3GHz.  Diplexers could be used to direct 
signal of different frequency content through the two different channels of the channel emulator.  
Due to the early difficulties finding resistive power dividers that could provide the desired 
isolation and frequency coverage without too much loss, the team decided to use cascaded 
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directional couplers to perform the same function.  A diagram showing the design of the four-
way splitter formed by cascading three couplers is shown in Figure 39. 
 
Figure 39: Four-way splitter created from three cascaded couplers. This design is not very lossy and provides enough 
isolation between paths. 
Couplers typically have much higher isolation with less loss and the team was able to find two 
different couplers to support the two frequency bands.  The team selected a circulator by DiTom 
Inc. to support the 2 to 8GHz band with an amplifier followed by an attenuator pad to provide 
isolation for the 30MHz to 3GHz band.  The same Hittite attenuator is used in the final design.  
Table 7 shows the parts selected for each of the two frequency bands. 
Table 7: The channel emulator was channelized into two separate frequency bands, 30MHz - 3GHz and 2 - 8GHz, with two 
separate sets of parts.  
Frequency Range Splitter Circulator Programmable attenuator 
30MHz – 3GHz 180  hybrid coupler 
(MACOM H-183-4) 
Amplifier (unselected) 0 – 31.5dB 
(Hittite HMC-C018) 
2GHz – 8GHz 180  Hybrid Coupler 
(Krytar model 4020080) 
Circulator (DiTom 
D3C2080) 
Same as above 
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Because the couplers that support the 30MHz to 3GHz frequency band have a 12 week lead time 
and the duration of the MQP is only nine weeks, the team chose to focus on building the 2 to 
8GHz portion while providing plans for later implementation of the lower frequency band.  The 
design shown in Figure 40 is the 2 to 8GHz 4 radio channel emulator that the team decided to 
focus on during the seven week MQP. 
 
Figure 40: The team decided to focus on a four node channel emulator that works from 2 to 8GHz. Each 4-way 
splitter/combiner is composed of three cascaded couplers.  
In addition, the team chose to start by ordering enough parts for a four radio channel emulator.  
Time allowing, this channel emulator could be scaled up to support more nodes.  
3.2 Attenuator Control 
Controlling attenuators in the channel emulator in order to emulate changing radio geometries 
was an important aspect of the channel emulator design.  Design specifications call for 
 53 
attenuators to be able to switch, as a group, within a millisecond or less.  The chosen attenuator, 
Hittite’s HMC-C018, is capable of switching at this speed or faster.  This specific attenuator has 
four digital inputs (clock, reset, serial input, and latch) and requires a negative five volt power 
rail and ground.  Due to availability, a National Instruments PCI card (NI 6601) with digital I/O 
was selected to serve as the control interface.  Digital signals from the card were routed through 
a National Instruments SCB-68 breakout board and to a breadboard where the attenuators were 
connected.  Originally, the team planned to control the cards using MATLAB.  During assembly 
and testing of the attenuator control circuit, a number of problems arose and were addressed, 
ultimately leading to the final design. 
In order to emulate a moving configuration of radio nodes, radio separation is represented with 
meaningful attenuation values.  A MATLAB function was written to calculate attenuation values 
between all node pairs at certain time intervals based upon the start location of each radio, the 
stop location of each radio, and the duration of the experiment in seconds.  The attenuation 
values calculated by this function are converted to a bit pattern to be written to the PCI card.  
Originally the team intended to use MATLAB to write digital words to the card but this method 
was found to be too slow for the speed specification.  To address the speed concern, the bit 
pattern produced in MATLAB was written to a text file.  A C program reads the text file line by 
line and writes each line to the PCI card.  
While the PCI card was able to write values to the attenuators at an adequate speed 
(approximately 40KHz), voltage overshoot on the different lines was found to be substantial.  
The clock line had ringing as much as three volts above the five volt logic high and as much as 2 
volts below zero on the falling edge.  These values exceed maximum ratings for the data pins of 
the attenuators.  In order to address ringing, a ringing suppressant circuit was added at the end of 
each data line on the bread board.  This circuit is shown in Figure 41 below. 
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Figure 41: Original ringing suppressing circuit with PCI Card (Left) and Programmable Attenuator (Right). This circuit worked 
well enough when there were fewer attenuators.  
When the data line goes high, the lower diode goes into reverse bias and the drop across the 
upper diode goes to approximately zero.  The diodes help to clamp down on overshoots in the 
digital signal and the resister dampens the ringing even further.  While this circuit slows the rise 
and fall times, it did not appear to negatively impact the functionality of the attenuator.  
Further challenges were encountered in scaling up the setup to support additional attenuators.  
Initially, the design involved supporting multiple attenuators with a shared clock, latch, and reset 
pin because these pins are the same for all of the attenuators.  It is the serial input that determines 
each attenuators unique value so every attenuator has a distinct serial line.  However, a single 
clock, latch, and reset pin were found to be insufficient to support more than two attenuators 
reliably.  This is most likely due to a considerable voltage drop across the large resister used to 
dampen ringing.  In response to this issue, more clock, reset, and latch lines were broken out 
from the card such that each line supports no more than two attenuators.  The additional clock 
lines remedied the power issues but increased ringing in all of the other signal lines.  Ringing in 
many of the latch lines occurred whenever the clock switched states, sometimes causing the 
attenuator to latch a new value.  To resolve this problem, a new ringing suppressing circuit was 
designed.  This circuit is shown in Figure 42. 
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Figure 42: Final ringing suppressing circuit with added buffer capacitors placed within close proximity to data lines, and 
twisted pair cables (paired with GND) for each data signal.  Note: Twisted Pair cable is not an inductor. 
In addition to suppressing the ringing with the circuit shown in Figure 42, other precautions were 
taken to ensure the integrity of the digital lines.  All alike lines were grouped together to 
minimize the exposure of lower frequency signals like the latch to ringing caused by higher 
frequency signals like the clock.  Also, each signal line was twisted with a ground from the 
breakout board as suggested by the PCI card datasheet.  These precautions in combination with 
the new ringing suppressing circuit worked well and are part of the final design.  Once the 
system that drives the attenuators was completely designed, attenuators were added to the system 
one by one and tested individually to ensure functionality.  With the final design of the channel 
emulator was determined, the team selected several techniques for testing individual parts and 
then the channel emulator as a whole.  These methods will be discussed in the subsequent 
section. 
3.3 Channel Emulator Construction and Preliminary Testing 
In order to verify the functionality of each individual component in the channel emulator as well 
as the system as a whole, the team conducted a variety of tests.  S-parameter measurements were 
collected for individual parts and for the assembled system.  Two-tone testing was used to 
measure the linearity of attenuator and assembled channel emulator.  Finally, the rise and fall 
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time of the attenuator transitioning between different attenuation states was measured.  The 
techniques used to perform these various tests will be described below. 
An Agilent E8364C PNA Network Analyzer was used to measure the s-parameters of all of the 
parts individually.  In instances where many of the same part were used, with the exception of 
the attenuators, several parts were randomly selected and measured to assess the degree of 
variability across the parts.  Measurements were saved as .s2p files and processed in MATLAB.  
These s-parameter measurements were used to produce graphs showing the insertion loss of each 
component across the 2 to 8GHz frequency band.  Attention was also paid to the isolation 
between the -3dB ports of the coupler and the accuracy and flatness of the different attenuator 
states throughout the complete frequency range.  In order to collect this data, each attenuation 
state was programmed into the device and then s-parameter data was collected.  In addition, 
return loss (S11) was measured for all of the different components and then for the system as a 
complete unit.  System gain was also measured. 
Additional tests were performed on the assembled system beyond just those performed using the 
network analyzer, including a two tone test and a measurement of rise and fall time in the 
attenuator.  One of these tests was a two tone test to measure the third-order intercept point of the 
device.  This is a measurement to determine the degree of nonlinearity in a system.  In a two-tone 
test, two sinusoids of equal power, approximately a megahertz apart, are fed into a system.  The 
setup we used is shown below in Figure 43. 
 
Figure 43: Two-tone test setup.  From left to right: Signal Generators, Isolators, Power Divider, Device Under Test (DUT), 
Spectrum Analyzer.  The two-tone test helps to identify third order nonlinearities of a RF device. 
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 The circulators shown in the diagram, with the third port terminated in a fifty ohm load, are used 
to increase isolation between the two branches of the power splitter.  The splitter combines the 
two sinusoids and feeds them into the device under test, the attenuator.  The output of the 
attenuator is fed to a spectrum analyzer which is used to measure the third-order intermodulation 
products of the two sinusoids.  Care was taken to ensure that the intermodulation products 
originated in the attenuator rather than in the front end of the spectrum analyzer itself.  If the first 
fundamental tone is at frequency    and the second tone is at frequency    then the two third-
order intermodulation products are at: 
                    (3.1) 
                    (3.2) 
If the test is set up properly, the third-order intermodulation products should be approximately 
the same.  In order to calculate the third-order intermodulation distortion     , the power 
measured at the third-order intermodulation products      is subtracted from the power    at one 
of the fundamental tones [34]: 
                     (3.3) 
The output third-order intercept point is defined as 
 
     
    
 
            
(3.4) 
The input third-order intercept point      is simply the output third-order intercept point      
minus the gain G in the device.  
                  (3.5) 
The results of this test were used to confirm the values provided on the attenuator data sheet.  
After testing each individual part and the testbed system as a whole, the team further validated 
the testbed by executing a series of known PHY layer attacks using the testbed.  
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3.4 PHY layer jamming 
PHY layer jamming involves creating RF noise, pulses, or tones, with enough power to cause 
errors in transmission at the receiver.  A logical approach to recreating and validating proven 
PHY layer jamming techniques involved replicating and comparing results to other, repeatable 
experiments in literature.  Available resources limited the selection of these experiments, and 
although exact replication was not possible, similar procedures and equipment were used.  A list 
of the equipment used is shown in Table 8.   
Table 8: List of equipment used in PHY layer attacks by name, model, and specifications. 
Device Model Specifications 
Signal Generator (Jammer) HP 83622A – HP Synthesized Sweeper 2 – 20GHz 
USRP (Jammer) USRPN210 2.4 – 2.5GHz 
Gumstix Computer/Radio Gumstix Overo Fire COM Wi-Fi 802.11b/g 
Circulator D3C2080 – DITOM SMA Circulator 2-8GHz 
Power Meter E4419B – Agilent EPM Series   
Signal Analyzer N9010A – Agilent EXA Signal Analyzer 9KHz – 26.5GHz 
DC Power Supply E3610A – HP DC Power Supply 0-15 V, 0-3 A 
Attenuator Pad (Various) Weinshel Engineering 3-20dB 
RF Cables  SMA 
 
Most jamming methods are aimed at the receiver; hence this experiment will focus primarily on 
the receiver’s ability to maintain throughput despite interference.  The parameters used with each 
type of jamming signal are described in the following section.   
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The signals listed below are created primarily with a USRP using GNURadio.  Due to the 
hardware limitations of the USRP (mainly, speed and bandwidth), a noise or signal generator 
was used in creating large bandwidth signals and pulsed noise. 
 Digital Noise Jamming 
o BPSK modulated pseudorandom data at 20 M samples/second using USRP & 
GNURadio 
 Pulse Noise Jamming 
o AWGN Noise pulsed with pulse lengths of 100 µS – 1000 µS and pulse intervals 
of 1 mS to 10 mS. 
 Sweep Tone Jamming 
o A single sine wave swept across the 2.4GHz Wi-Fi band (100MHz) in 0.5 to 20 
seconds. 
Validating the Testbed against Previous Experiments 
Conducting experiments on a two-radio network allowed efficient use of time while waiting for 
equipment to arrive (digital attenuators and couplers) while partially validating the procedure and 
equipment against previous experiments in the literature [7], [35].  This also helped to prepare 
and refine any methods used for the final experiment involving mobility, described in section 
3.3.2.  After all equipment had been prepared and assembled, our team implemented identical 
tests on a three-radio (four nodes total) network before proceeding to mobile scenarios.  
The two-radio network included two radio nodes, a jammer node, and a signal analyzer, shown 
in Figure 44.  The radio nodes consist of individual Gumstix computers, each with their own Wi-
Fi enabled 802.11b/g radio with external u.FL connectors (miniature coaxial RF connectors).  
Special u.FL adapters were required to connect each radio to the SMA cables used in the 
experiment.  The jammer node was either a USRP or a signal generator depending on the 
experiment.  A signal analyzer measured the power level of the signal from the transmitter 
compared to the signal from the jammer, also known as the Signal to Jammer Ratio (SJR). 
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Figure 44: Two Radio Network consisting of Attenuators, Circulators, and Power Dividers.  Radios are Gumstix computers 
with Wi-Fi 802.11b/g.  Jammers used are: USRPN210, Signal Generators, or Noise Generators. 
Circulators prevented ACK message interference at the signal analyzer.  Otherwise, the signal 
analyzer would report high signal levels that originate from the receiver, inadvertently affecting 
perceived SJR.  Coaxial SMA (Sub-Miniature Version A) RF connectors were used to connect 
each device.  Software control of each radio’s transmit power was not possible, thus Attenuator 
pads were used to achieve desired signal levels in the receiver (-45 to -50dBm).   
One power divider (left) combined the transmit signal and the jammer signal.  The other power 
divider (right) separated the signal, one path leading to the signal analyzer and one path leading 
to the receiver radio.  Attenuation for each device was recorded, in addition to verifying 
frequency response in the desired 2.4GHz band.   
Mobile PHY Layer Jamming on the RF Channel Emulator 
One of the more important criterions to an analog channel emulator is realism.  For the same 
purpose, this project includes a mobile scenario where all nodes can vary their (virtual) distance 
between each other.  Their connections to the RF channel emulator are simplified in Figure 45. 
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Figure 45: Simplified diagram of connections between radio nodes and RF Channel Emulator.  Each node can vary their 
distance between every other node. 
The “RF Cloud” is a layer of abstraction controlled by digital attenuators that emulate distance, 
allowing the experiment to demonstrate the effectiveness of a denial of service attack in a mobile 
scenario.  This layer of mobility allows the testbed to take one step closer to real-life.  There are 
a number of interesting mobile scenarios that are useful demonstrations of how well the DoS 
attack would work, although only three are chosen for this report. 
Listed in the following section are three mobile scenarios where the jammer is moving towards 
or away from the network.  In each experiment, the jammer node moves toward the network at a 
rate of approximately 2 meters/second, passes within 3 meters of the closest radio node, and 
continues through towards the end point.  Iperf is used to exchange traffic at 11 Mbit/s using 
802.11b (DSSS). 
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Figure 46: Equidistant node topology.  All nodes are the same distance from each other and can exchange data with all other 
nodes.  The jammer will approach the network at a rate of 2 meter/sec. 
All nodes in this experiment are stationary and can exchange data at the same rate.  A jammer 
moving toward this network would mimic a scenario in which there are local, neglected Wi-Fi 
emitters (R1, R2, and R3) in an uninhibited, equidistant topology.  Figure 47 depicts a realistic 
scenario of this situation.   
 63 
 
Figure 47: Realistic picture of Wi-Fi scenario.  Three Wi-Fi emitters (Blue) within 15 meters of another.  All (Blue) nodes can 
exchange data at the same rate.  The Emergency Responder (Red) approaches the network and passes through while 
attempting to regain spectrum.  Note: not to scale. 
Figure 47 is a picture taken immediately after Hurricane Katrina passed through in New Orleans.  
A hypothetical emergency responder would drive through on a boat and attempt to regain 
network resources from the Wi-Fi emitters.  Note that this picture does not indicate exact 
distance, nor does it represent the maximum effective distance of the Wi-Fi signals.  For a more 
specific geometric reference, refer to Figure 48. 
The attenuation associated with the RF channel emulator, in addition to insertion loss, has a 
dynamic range of 20dB to 51.5dB.  With respect to FSPL, this translates into a distance of 1-3 
meters that the network can emulate.  To represent realistic scenarios, attenuator pads were 
added to each radio, contributing to a range of 50dB to 81.5dB, or a distance of 3-120 meters 
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(range varies with each antenna, but the maximum range of Wi-Fi 802.11b/g in indoor 
environments is typically less than 100 m [36]).   
In other words, each radio cannot “move” (programmable attenuators emulate mobility) further 
than 120 meters or closer than 3 meters from another node.  Figure 48 uses Google Maps to 
illustrate the Equidistant node scenario shown previously, where the emergency responder is at 
most 100 meters away from the furthest node, and at least 3 meters from the closest node, at any 
one time. 
 
Figure 48: Map of Equidistance Node scenario.  Three Wi-Fi emitters (Blue) within 15 meters of another; each can exchange 
data at the same rate.  The Emergency Responder (Red) approaches the network and passes through while attempting to 
regain spectrum.  Note: not to scale. 
For simplicity, the mobile scenario involves only one moving node: the emergency responder.  
Radio nodes R1, R2, and R3 are approximately 15 m apart in an equilateral triangle.  The main 
purpose of these positions is to allow each node to transmit and receive at the same rate.  The 
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emergency responder begins 100 m from R3, and passes through the network at a rate of 2 m/s 
until it is 100 m from R2.  The values of attenuation between each node is generated  using a 
script in Matlab, and then passed to a program written in C that controls the signals sent to the 
NI-PCI card, which controls the attenuators. 
 
Figure 49: Hidden Node topology.  R1 (Left) and R3 (Right) cannot communicate directly with each other.  R2 can 
communicate with both nodes.  The jammer moves toward this network at a rate of ~2 meters/sec. 
This topology was briefly introduced as the Hidden Node problem in the Background section.  
The scenario will demonstrate the effectiveness of a jammer moving towards a network that 
relies on the RTS/CTS mechanism. 
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Figure 50: Map of Hidden Node topology.  Three Wi-Fi emitters (blue, R1, R2, and R3, from left to right).  R1 cannot 
communicate with R3 and vice versa.  The Emergency Responder (Red) approaches the network and passes through, 
attempting to regain spectrum.  Note: not to scale. 
Figure 50 shows a map of the hidden node scenario.  The total travel distance is only 100 meters 
in this experiment.  Since the run time of each experiment is not directly controllable and is 
typically 90 seconds, the jammer is actually moving more slowly (1.1 m/s) through this 
topology.   
Due to time limitations of this course, flow control of the attenuator program is beyond the scope 
of this project.  Our team was not able to program the control script to provide accurate timing 
and execution, thus the difference in speed of the jammer will remain a small discrepancy among 
the results.   
A distant node topology is described in Figure 51.  The distant node is R3 and is approximately 
50 m away from R2, and 70 m away from R1.  Since R1 and R3 are normally able to 
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communicate from a distance of 70 m, their connection within the RF testbed will be terminated 
with a 50 Ω load. 
 
Figure 51: Distant Node topology.  Each node starts equidistant from other nodes and moves away from the network in the 
opposite direction.  The jammer approaches the network at a rate of 2 meters/sec. 
A distant node topology is similar to hidden node topology except that one node is at a greater 
distance away from the other two nodes.  It is assumed that this node is not able to achieve the 
same data rate and contend for resources at the same capacity as a closer node.   
This could be an insightful subject in future research regarding optimal jamming methods, as the 
ability to jam nodes that reach to distant networks is highly valuable, and any network topology 
is likely to have a distant node at some location. 
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Figure 52: Map of Distant Node topology.  Three Wi-Fi emitters.  R1 cannot communicate with R3 and vice versa.  The 
Emergency Responder (Red) approaches the network and passes through, attempting to regain spectrum.  Note: not to scale. 
Figure 52 helps to illustrate the distances between each node and the start and end position of the 
jammer.  For the purposes of this experiment, the link between R1 and R3 is disconnected 
manually.  This is due to the dynamic range limitation of the attenuators, which can only emulate 
0-31.5dB of attenuation. 
3.5 MAC Layer Jamming 
An important aspect to jamming is not only physical jamming, but protocol jamming.  The 
techniques listed in the next section target the MAC protocol of the Data Link layer in IEEE 
802.11b/g.  Upper protocols require more knowledge about the network and a higher degree of 
sophistication, but can prove to be much more efficient than RF jamming at the PHY layer.   
Original Idea: Reactive Beacon Frame Injection 
A literature review of the current state of the art in MAC jamming produced some ideas of 
possible new attacks that may be able to target management of the network.  Similar attacks that 
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target management frames are Disassociation or Deauthentication attacks which attempt to spoof 
(fake) frames that tell others a client has left the network, forcing the target to continuously 
rejoin the network before being able to transmit.  Flooding attacks are also related; they spoof 
management frames (beacon or authentication/association frames), typically thousands at a time, 
in order to cause the client to overflow a buffer and crash, fill its association table, or to waste its 
resources by continuously connecting with fake clients. 
We propose a method called “Reactive Beacon Frame Injection,” based on manipulating the 
exchange of network parameters such as data rate, encryption, synchronization, modulation, and 
channel specification.  This attack spoofs frames directly after (or immediately before) the target 
user sends its own beacon, notifying all clients that the user wishes to use incorrect network 
parameters (low data rates, weak encryption or none at all, unspecified modulation schemes, 
etc.).  It is suspected that this technique will force other clients to disregard the original beacon 
frame and use the spoofed (manipulated) frame instead.  This would cause other clients to use 
the manipulated network parameters when sending packets to the target, forcing the target to 
drop those packets.  Figure 53 shows this procedure in action. 
 
Figure 53: Reactive Beacon Frame Injection attack on IEEE 802.11b/g.  The attack injects a manipulated beacon frame that 
seems as though it came from the target client.  Subsequent packets sent to that client are then using the wrong network 
parameters, resulting in dropped packets and/or weakened security. 
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The ideal location to inject a fake beacon frame is not particularly known, although it is 
suspected to be either immediately before or after the target’s beacon frame.  The USRP used in 
this experiment can respond on the order of milliseconds, but this is too slow of a reaction to 
effectively replace beacon frames as they are sent.  On the other hand, nodes in Ad-hoc mode 
will typically alternate sending beacons every 10 mS; therefore the attacker only has to 
synchronize to this interval to be effective.  However, if the target notices the attacker’s fake 
beacon frame, it may attempt to retransmit its beacon directly after, which may inadvertently 
shift the beacon interval.  In this case the attacker will have to detect and react to this shift in the 
interval. 
Implementing the Attack 
Demonstrating a proof of concept may be possible by simply testing the theory using the USRP 
to record and play back beacon frames.  However, the effectiveness and efficiency of the attack 
may be greatly enhanced by using specialized tools and hardware, such as those provided with 
the Linux distribution “Backtrack.” 
Typically, Gumstix radios are equipped with standard, basic tools which only allow the operator 
to view signal levels, transmitted/received packets, and change a few parameters such as 
modulation (between b or g), Ad-hoc or AP mode, and encryption (WEP or WPA).  In order to 
manipulate and inject MAC frames, a highly configurable wireless card was used, along with a 
wireless penetration operating system called Backtrack.  Backtrack contains tools and drivers 
that provide users with specialized access to certain wireless hardware.  The AWUS036H 
wireless card was chosen based upon its known compatibility with Backtrack. 
Before attempting this method using specialized hardware, our team conducted a quick test of 
the theory behind the attack with a USRP and GNURadio.  A network of two radios was 
prepared using the four node testbed.  As previously mentioned, in Ad-hoc mode, radios will 
alternate sending beacon frames approximately every 10 mS.  This transmission was recorded 
using a USRP.  The radios kept the same IP addresses, but the configuration of encryption, data 
rate, and modulation was altered.  While using Iperf to generate traffic between the two nodes 
and record throughput, the recorded transmission of beacon frames was played back into the 
network.  If the theory is correct, this playback of old beacon frames would affect the network in 
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two ways: (1) the beacon frames may cause collisions in the transfer of packets, (2) the clients 
will accept the recorded (false) beacon information and change their data rate, encryption and 
modulation, and a subsequent drop in throughput should be observed. 
A sophisticated attack could similarly be executed using tools found in Backtrack.  The attack 
begins with “Wireshark,” which captures beacon packets and uses the time stamps to specify the 
beacon interval.  The time-stamp, IP and MAC addresses are relayed to “aireplay,” a program 
that can inject falsified beacon frames into the network.  If successful, a script that can utilize 
these programs will be able to implement the same beacon frame attack described above.   
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4 Results 
Throughout the duration of the project, a variety of results and measurements were collected.  
The team compiled several different types of data to verify the functionality of the testbed.  
Before assembly, measurements were taken to characterize the performance of different channel 
emulator components across the band.  Once constructed, additional measurements were taken 
and known PHY layer experiments were repeated on the complete testbed for validation and 
verification.  After the functionality of the testbed was characterized, three different types of 
PHY layer jamming were implemented using the channel emulator mobility feature.  Results 
from all of these different measurements and experiments will be presented in the following 
chapter.  
4.1 Channel Emulator: Testing and Validation 
A number of different measurements were taken to validate and characterize the channel 
emulator components and the system as a whole.  S-parameters were collected for all of the 
individual components as well as for the assembled channel emulator.  Basic PHY layer 
jamming techniques were performed using different RF hardware and then repeated on the 
testbed to check performance.  Channel emulator related results are below; starting with tests 
performed on the individual components, followed by images of the assembled system and tests 
on the complete testbed. 
Hittite Attenuator 
Results that describe the insertion loss and flatness of major attenuation states are shown below 
in Figure 54.  The measurement was taken on the network analyzer from DC to 8GHz.  Insertion 
loss is shown in blue.  Major attenuation states, including 0.5dB, 1dB, 2dB, 4dB, 8dB, and 16dB, 
are shown in red.  These states are adjusted to be relative to the insertion loss state of the device. 
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Figure 54: Major attenuation states, adjusted to insertion loss, DC to 8GHz. Insertion loss is shown in blue. Attenuation states 
are relatively flat across the band. 
Figure 54 shows that attenuation remains relatively flat across the band.  Furthermore, across the 
narrower Wi-Fi band (2.4GHz to 2.425GHz), variation is extremely low.  The team also looked 
into the maximum switching speed of the attenuator in the channel emulator setup to determine if 
the 1 ms specification had been met.   
An oscilloscope screen shot of the attenuator stepping through its different attenuation states is 
shown in Figure 55.  The setting at the far left of the screenshot, where the waveform has the 
largest amplitude, corresponds to the zero attenuation state. This state is the result of insertion 
loss alone.  At the lowest amplitude, the attenuator is programmed to maximum attenuation, or 
31.5dB.  
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Figure 55: A tone being fed through the attenuator while it steps through different attenuation settings. The blue image on 
the left shows an instance of the attenuator latching the wrong state. Note: blue/grey portion of image have been inverted 
to improve visibility. 
Based upon Figure 55, the attenuator switches within approximately 1 millisecond.  On occasion, 
it takes slightly more or less time.  This is likely due to the asynchronous nature of the clock 
driven by non-real-time controlling computer. For the purpose of this project, this was not a 
problem. The inset to the left of Figure 55 also demonstrates that every once in a while for a very 
brief amount of time, generally less than 100 us, the attenuator latches the wrong value.  This is 
most apparent in the blue box on the left of the plot, where a lower attenuation state is briefly 
latched.   
This discrepancy is less than 100 us and was determined to have a minimal impact on the metrics 
for network performance.  This might happen when one of the high density pin connectors used 
to interface the data lines to the attenuators shifts or moves possibly causing the attenuator to 
latch at the wrong time.  To minimize the likelihood of interference, the controller continually re-
latches the current setting.  This way, even if the attenuation state suddenly changes, it is very 
quickly reset back to the desired state. 
Krytar Coupler 
Several performance metrics of the couplers were important to verify, including isolation 
between -3dB ports, return loss looking into all three ports of interest, and the insertion loss of 
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the device.  Measurements to characterize isolation between the two -3dB ports of the couplers 
were conducted on the network analyzer.  Isolation was measured across a 2 to 8GHz band for 
two different couplers.  Results for the first coupler are shown in red and the second coupler is 
shown in blue in Figure 56. 
 
Figure 56: Isolation between -3dB ports of two different couplers. This measurement was taken from 2 to 8GHz with the 
vector network analyzer. 
The datasheet for the coupler specifies that isolation should be greater than 18dB.  From Figure 
55Figure 56: Isolation between -3dB ports of two different couplers. This measurement was 
taken from 2 to 8GHz with the vector network analyzer, the isolation between ports is well above 
this.  In fact, across the 2GHz to 8GHz band, the isolation is consistently above 20dB.  In the 
Wi-Fi band, where the team did the majority of the experiments, the isolation is greater than 
30dB. The specification for the channel emulator required isolation greater than 20dB between 
the two -3dB ports; from these measurements it was determined that this specification had been 
satisfied. 
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Return loss was also measured on both -3dB ports and the sum port of the coupler.  Results of 
this measurement from 2 to 8GHz are shown below in Figure 59.  The red and blue lines are the 
return loss at the two -3dB ports.  The black line is the return loss measured at the sum port.  
While the datasheet does not specify a return loss for any ports of the coupler, all three ports are 
better than 15dB.  In the Wi-Fi band, return loss is greater than 25dB at all ports. 
 
Figure 57: Coupler return loss, measured from 2 to 8GHz.  Return loss for each of the -3dB ports shown in red and blue.  
Return loss for sum port shown in black. 
Coupler insertion loss was measured using the network analyzer for two different couplers.  The 
results for this measurement are shown in Figure 58.  For each of the two couplers measured, 
insertion loss was measured between the sum port and both of the -3dB ports.  The first coupler 
measured is shown in red, the second coupler measured is shown in blue. 
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Figure 58: Coupler insertion loss from sum port to both -3dB ports for two different couplers. Each of the two blue lines 
correspond to the loss measurement between the sum port and one of the -3dB ports while the two red lines are the same 
for the other coupler measured. This measurement was taken from 2 to 8GHz. 
From Figure 58, it is clear that there is little variation between the two couplers measured.  The 
datasheet for this device specifies insertion loss to be less than 1.1dB across the 2 to 8GHz 
bandwidth.  In addition to that 1.1dB loss, we would expect another 3dB loss due to the fact that 
the power at the sum port is being divided two ways.  In total, the loss from the sum port to each 
-3dB port should be no more than 4.1dB.  This is verified in the results shown in Figure 58.  For 
the 2 to 8GHz range, the loss remains below 4dB.  In the Wi-Fi band, loss is below 3.6dB.  For 
the channel emulator to function properly it is important to have relatively flat loss across the 
band and this was confirmed to be the case for the coupler in these particular measurements. 
DiTom Circulator 
Measurements on the DiTom circulator included a measurement of insertion loss between two 
ports as well as a measurement of the reverse isolation between the same two ports.  Results 
were collected for all three port pairs for one of the circulators and are shown in Figure 59.  Each 
pair of ports is shown in red, blue, or black.  Insertion loss is generally between 1 and 3dB while 
isolation between the ports is typically between 9 and 13dB across the band. 
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Figure 59: Circulator insertion loss (top) and isolation (bottom), measured from 2 to 8GHz with network analyzer. 
The insertion loss in the circulator is consistently below 3dB but not below the 1.5dB specified 
on the datasheet.  The datasheet also claims isolation provided is 10dB minimum in the 2 to 
8GHz range.  This doesn’t seem to be the case in Figure 59, although in the Wi-Fi band, isolation 
is no lower than 10dB. 
 
Figure 60: Return loss of DiTom circulator, measured from 2 to 8GHz with network analyzer. Each different color represents 
one of the three different ports of the device. 
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The return loss from each of the three ports of the circulator was measured and the results are 
shown in Figure 60.  The three ports are shown in red, blue, and black.  Return loss is generally 
between 8 and 17dB, and is acceptable for the channel emulator design. 
Assembled RF Testbed 
The final assembled testbed, including the channel emulator component and complete with radio 
hardware is shown below in Figure 61.  Key components of the setup are labeled, including radio 
hardware, circulators, couplers, programmable attenuators, and the control circuitry for the 
attenuators. 
 
Figure 61: Assembled RF Analog Testbed. Radio hardware is on the far left, with circulators and couplers towards the middle. 
Attenuators are on the breadboard with the PCI breakout board on the far right. 
The transmitting and receiving cascaded couplers connected to the circulators are shown towards 
the middle of Figure 61.  A close-up photograph of this part of the setup is labeled in Figure 62. 
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Figure 62: Circulators and cascaded couplers in final channel emulator configuration. The transmit and receive sides of the 
circulators are circled in green. 
Circulators are shown in grey on the far left with the transmitting and receiving sides labeled.  
The transmit side feeds into a series of cascaded couplers.  The output from these couplers goes 
to the receiving set of couplers through the twelve programmable attenuators.  Figure 63 shows 
these programmable attenuators with the control circuitry, including the ringing suppression 
circuit. 
 
Figure 63: Programmable attenuators with ringing suppression circuit on breadboard 
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The programmable attenuators are in two stacks of six, towards the left of Figure 63.  The data 
lines from the PCI controller card are in the bottom right of the image, each twisted with a 
ground return.  The breakout board for the PCI controller is depicted in Figure 64, both closed 
(top) and open (bottom).  
 
Figure 64: SCB-68 NI breakout board closed (top) and open (bottom). Wires from this board are each twisted with a ground 
wire and connected to the attenuators on the breadboard. 
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Testing and measurements on the assembled system 
S-parameters were measured for each of the twelve channel paths to verify that loss from 
channel to channel was sufficiently uniform in all of the channels.  As mentioned before, the 
twelve paths each have a unique attenuator.  Every radio pair has two paths between them to 
accommodate full duplex communication.  For example, path 1 and path 4 both go between radio 
1 and radio 2.  However, path 1 allows radio 1 to transmit to radio 2 while path 4 allows 
communications from radio 2 back to radio 1.  The twelve different paths are summarized in 
Table 9. 
Table 9:  The twelve 'paths' in the channel emulator. Each path has its own programmable attenuator. 
Path Number Transmitting Radio Receiving Radio 
1 1 2 
2 1 3 
3 1 4 
4 2 1 
5 2 3 
6 2 4 
7 3 1 
8 3 2 
9 3 4 
10 4 1 
11 4 2 
12 4 3 
 
It is important that the loss throughout the system does not vary more than 2dB between each of 
the paths.  Beyond this, calibration can be done in the software as necessary.  Based on measured 
component values, path loss was to be around 21dB.  This number is the sum of the loss 
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measured in each individual part, as shown in Figure 65.  Parts are listed in the table in the order 
that they appear in the system, from transmit to receive. 
 
Figure 65: analysis throughout the system, based upon measured loss in each individual part at 2.4GHz. Expected loss 
through the system is 21dB. 
The loss each path, as measured using the network analyzer before calibrating the system, is 
shown on the left of Figure 66.  As expected, the total loss is approximately 21dB throughout the 
system. 
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Figure 66: Gain through the system on all twelve paths, before (left) and after calibration (right). Colored lines correspond to 
12 distinct paths through emulator. 
While the loss across the different channels is similar, it is not within 2dB of variation between 
paths at any given frequency as specified for the channel emulator.  By adding attenuator pads to 
some of the paths with the least loss, the specification can be achieved.  The result of adding 
attenuator pads is shown on the right of Figure 66, where the variation in loss between paths is 
below 2dB.  
Once the system was calibrated, a two tone test was conducted to determine the power 
limitations of the system.  The tones were set at 2.44GHz and 2.441GHz, one megahertz apart.  
Based upon these frequencies, the third order intermodulation products would be expected at 
2.439GHz and 2.442GHz.  As shown in Figure 43, the two RF tones were fed into a resistive 
power combiner with circulators at the input for additional isolation.  Prior to feeding the 
combined tones into the channel emulator, they were fed directly into the spectrum analyzer.  
The spectrum of the combined tones before going into channel emulator is shown in Figure 67.  
 85 
 
Figure 67: Spectrum of two tones combined, before entering the channel emulator 
The power of the two tones measured by the spectrum analyzer is 5dBm.  The coax cables used 
to connect the combined signals to the spectrum analyzer had a loss of about 8dB so the strength 
of the tones when connected directly to the channel emulator would be approximately 13dBm 
each.  The spurs seen at 2.439GHz and at 2.442GHz are at -77dBc, that is 77dB below the input 
tones, and are probably due to either the front end of the spectrum analyzer or nonlinearities in 
other components such as the circulators.  The 77dB spur range is sufficient for measuring 
nonlinearities in the switches. 
After characterizing the spectrum of the combined tones, they were fed into one of the ports of 
the channel emulator.  A different port was connected to the spectrum analyzer to visualize the 
resulting spectrum.  The result of this measurement is shown in Figure 68 for attenuators set at 
the zero attenuation state, Figure 69 for attenuators programmed to 16dB, and Figure 70 for an 
attenuation setting of 31.5dB. 
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Figure 68: Two tones through the system, attenuators set to insertion loss 
 
Figure 69: Two tones through the system, attenuators set to 16dB setting 
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Figure 70: Two tones through the system, attenuators set to 31.5dB setting 
In this test, the power in the signal generators was turned up to the maximum allowable strength, 
and we did not observe any spurs.  In order to verify that this is a reasonable result, the team used 
the third order input intercept point provided on the datasheet to back-calculate for the power 
expected at the third order intercept products, assuming the attenuator is the primary source of 
intermodulation distortion.  Based upon this calculation, the team found that the power expected 
at the third order intercept points would be well below the noise floor, so the measured results 
make sense.   
The purpose of this experiment was to verify that any intermodulation products were suitably 
below the threshold for our experiment.  Since the radios used in this experiment can operate at 
an SNR as low as 20dB, the team does not expect any problems.  To better describe this system, 
more powerful tones might be fed into the channel emulator so that the intermodulation products 
might be observed above the noise floor.  Also, the measurement was spur free for greater than 
50dB at the highest attenuation setting which is more than sufficient for the channel emulator 
needs. 
The team also repeated a published PHY layer DoS attack on a two radio network similar to the 
one described in the literature [7].  Results of the repeated two radio network are shown in Figure 
 88 
94, Figure 95, and Figure 96 in the Appendix.  Once results similar to the paper were obtained on 
the two radio network, the same tests were repeated on the four radio channel emulator to ensure 
functionality.  None of these tests use the mobility aspect of the channel emulator.  These tests 
confirmed that our testing parameters were acceptable measures of network operability.  Results 
of these experiments are below, including pulse, sweep, and digital jamming.  
There were some differences between the two and four radio networks but these can be 
explained due to the differences in equipment, hardware, and software.  We begin with 
comparing pulse jamming tests with the two radio testbed, and then the four radio testbed in 
Figure 71. 
 
Figure 71: Pulse Jamming tests: Throughput vs. Pulse length & period in Two Radio (A) testbed at 11Mbit/sec (DSSS), 
9Mbit/sec (OFDM), and on the Four Radio testbed (B) at 11Mbit/sec (DSSS), 9Mbit/sec (OFDM). 
The two radio testbed provides verification and validation of the procedure, equipment, and 
analysis of the listed jamming techniques.  Each experiment is a direct replication of peer-
reviewed research obtained from reputable sources [7], using similar software and hardware.  
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Shown in Figure 71, the pulse lengths (left column) are varied between 100 µS to 1000 µS, and 
pulse periods are varied between 1 mS and 10 mS.  If the pulse length and period are equal, the 
jammer is continuous (bottom right corner). 
When comparing Figure 71 (A) with (B) we notice that the results between the tests beds are 
similar, although the four radio testbed shows an overall 7% increase in throughput compared 
with the previous testbed.  This is displayed clearly in Figure 73 which examines the differences 
in performance observed between the two and four radio testbed.  Sweep jamming results are 
shown in Figure 72. 
 
Figure 72: Sweep Jamming tests: Throughput vs. SJR & Sweep time in Two Radio testbed (A) at 11Mbit/sec (DSSS), 9Mbit/sec 
(OFDM), and on the Four Radio testbed (B) at 11Mbit/sec (DSSS), 9Mbit/sec (OFDM).  Results are in Mbit/sec.  Signal to 
Jammer Ratio (SJR) and sweep time are varied. 
Figure 72 shows the effects when introducing a single sine wave swept across the entire Wi-Fi 
band (100MHz) in 0.5 to 20 seconds.  This is accomplished using the HP Synthesized Sweeper 
listed in Table 8.  Figure 72 lists sweep times (left column) along with the signal to jammer ratio 
(SJR).  The four radio testbed shows a slight decrease in jammer performance compared to the 
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two radio testbed.  An SJR of 10dB in the two radio testbed shows almost no effect on 
throughput, while the four radio testbed shows 17% reduction in throughput.   
 
Figure 73: Differences in performance of Two Radio Testbed vs. Four Radio Testbed when subject to Sweep and Pulse 
waveforms. 
To help compare these results, Figure 73 displays the absolute differences between the two 
testbeds.  The sweep waveform in Figure 73 (A), (B), shows a decrease in throughput compared 
to the two radio testbed (note that this translates to an increase in performance of the emergency 
responder).  It is suspected that the shielded boxes encased around the Gumstix in the four radio 
testbed may help prevent Wi-Fi radiation, which would prevent transmissions from bypassing 
RF cables and the sweep jammer.  However, this conflicts with the previous pulse jamming 
experiment where the performance of the jammer had decreased by approximately 7 percent.  
The maximum effect on throughput in Figure 72 evens out at approximately 2.78 Mbit/sec with 
an SJR of -15dB; very similar to the two radio testbed.  Overall, the new testbed shows a 2.8% 
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decrease in throughput using sweep tone jamming and a 7.87% increase in throughput using 
pulse jamming. 
Digital jamming on the two radio testbed was implemented using MATLAB Simulink and its 
UHD toolbox.  Due to a loss of software during a computer crash, the digital jamming technique 
was implemented on a readily available version of GNURadio.  This may help to explain some 
differences in the results, in particular the SJR at which throughput reaches zero, shown in 
Figure 74. 
 
Figure 74: Digital Jamming tests: Throughput vs. SJR on the Two Radio testbed using MATLAB (A) and Four Radio testbed  
using GNURadio (B) using 11 Mbit/sec DSSS and 9 Mbit/sec OFDM. 
Figure 74 shows digital jamming (pseudo random DBPSK at 2.4GHz) against DSSS (Blue) and 
OFDM (Red).  The previous testbed shows zero throughput at an SJR of 2dB (Figure 74 (A), 
circled in Red), while the new testbed shows zero throughput at an SJR of 8dB (Figure 74 B, 
circled in Red).  When first attempting the experiment, we found that transmissions would cease 
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at an unexpected SJR of 20dB.  After altering excess bandwidth settings on GNURadio, this 
point changed to 8dB.  This may suggest that the excess bandwidth or power produced using 
GNURadio is enough to drop throughput at a much lower SJR than when using MATLAB.   
Nearing the end of the project an opportunity arose that enabled us to test this theory.  The 
experiment was repeated using MATLAB with the emergency responder.  Results are displayed 
in Figure 75. 
 
Figure 75: Digital Jamming tests (Corrected): Throughput vs. SJR on the Two Radio testbed using MATLAB (A) and Four Radio 
testbed  using MATLAB (B) using 11 Mbit/sec DSSS and 9 Mbit/sec OFDM. 
After repeating the Digital jamming test in Figure 74 using MATLAB with the emergency 
responder in the four channel testbed, we found the results between the two testbeds to be within 
10% error.  A slight increase in the performance of the jammer is observed as throughput halts at 
a higher SJR in Figure 75 (B) than (A).  Additionally, the power spectrum density (PSD) was 
recorded ~6dB less when using MATLAB compared to GNURadio.  This confirms our 
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hypothesis stated earlier that the increase in performance in Figure 74 (B) was a direct result of 
the substitution of GNURadio for MATLAB. 
According to work by Harjula et. al., [7], there should exist some difference in performance 
against digital jamming between DSSS and OFDM, as OFDM resembles a digital-like signal and 
would be more susceptible to digital jamming than DSSS, which slightly resembles noise.  The 
lack of separation between DSSS and OFDM suggests that the Gumstix Wi-Fi radios may be 
changing modulation schemes.  In other words, the Wi-Fi radio may be selecting whether to use 
802.11b or 802.11g depending on signal conditions, even though they are strictly configured by 
the user.  We explore this question in Figure 76. 
 
Figure 76: Spectrum of OFDM (9 Mbit/sec, 802.11g) signal (A) and with the addition of a Digital jammer (B).  The graph in (A) 
shows a typical flat, OFDM signal modulation.  The graph in (B) shows the OFDM modulation changing to a DSSS-like signal 
when a Digital jammer is introduced. 
This experiment examines the spectrum of Wi-Fi signals using the signal analyzer listed in Table 
8 before and after a Digital jammer is introduced in the network.  Each Wi-Fi radio is set to use 
802.11g at 9 Mbit/s using the iwconfig utility.  Figure 76 (A) shows a typical Wi-Fi transmission; 
the spectrum is semi-flat at its peak, a characteristic of OFDM and 802.11g.  A Digital jammer is 
introduced with equal power (0 SJR), and begins to interfere with communication between the 
two radios.  What we notice is a drop in throughput and occasionally, the spectrum of the signal 
changes to a round shape, a characteristic of 802.11b.  Occasionally, ‘clipping’ effects may 
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appear when viewing the spectrum as in Figure 76 (B); this is likely an effect caused by the slow 
sweep pattern of the signal analyzer.  Our team made attempts to minimize this effect, but in the 
interest of showing the best possible explanation some clipping was acceptable. 
We propose two possible explanations; the jammer effectively breaks communication between 
both nodes, and each node subsequently and repeatedly sends beacon packets (which look 
similar to 802.11b signals).  Or, the Gumstix radios are self-configuring their own modulation, 
using 802.11b or 802.11g when it deems necessary.  However, combined with the information 
obtained from Figure 77, it is likely that the radio is self-configuring its modulation.
 
Figure 77: Spectrum of DSSS (11 Mbit/sec, 802.11b) signal (A) and with the addition of a Digital jammer (B).  The graph in (A) 
shows a typical DSSS signal modulation.  The graph in (B) shows the DSSS modulation changing to an OFDM-like signal when 
a Digital jammer is introduced. 
This experiment is similar to the previous except we first transmit data using 802.11b at 11 
Mbit/sec (DSSS) (set using the iwconfig utility).  Figure 77 (A) shows a typical 802.11b 
spectrum.  Then, we introduce a Digital jammer in Figure 77 (B).  Notice how the spectrum 
changes shape this time to a flat, OFDM shaped spectrum.  It is worth noting that after taking 
several samples, the flat-shaped spectrum samples were only a small percentage of the 802.11b 
shaped samples.  In other words, the radio primarily relies on 802.11b, but occasionally we can 
see the 802.11g modulation being used.  This behavior was observed only with the addition of an 
interferer, suggesting that it may be switching modulation to increase performance against 
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interference.  Again, these results imply that the differences noted in the testbed when compared 
to previously published research (Figure 94, found the Appendix), are due to the self-configuring 
adaptation of the Gumstix’ Wi-Fi radios when subject to interference. 
4.2 Wi-Fi mobile jamming experiments 
This section is primarily focused on the ability to accurately emulate distance between radio 
nodes over time.  Mobility is demonstrated by the results of the following experiments.  
Additionally, we examined the differences between digital, pulse, and sweep jamming 
techniques in equidistant, hidden, and distant node mobile scenarios.  To further understand the 
results, note the flow of traffic shown in Figure 78. 
 
Figure 78: Flow of data in mobile experiments.  All mobile data shown in graphs are transmitted in one direction by the prior 
node. 
It is possible to transmit between every node, however this is difficult with Iperf as there is no 
way to discern where the traffic originates.  Therefore, we decided to use one direction of traffic 
through each node.  Radio 1 will transmit data to Radio 2 (Red), Radio 2 transmits to Radio 3 
(Green), and Radio 3 transmits to Radio 1 (Blue).  All nodes will use the same standard of color 
throughout the following figures.  Using this method the throughput between each radio link can 
be measured.  Note that the following Digital jamming experiments are shown using GNURadio 
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not MATLAB, and reflect the gain in power when using GNURadio, discussed in earlier in 
Figure 74 and Figure 75. 
 
Figure 79: Equidistant node topology in a mobile environment: Throughput vs. Time (A), and Coordinate Grid of Radios and 
Jammer (B).  A Digital jamming node passes between three clients (Rx 1, 2, 3) that are equally spaced (15 meters from each 
node).   
Figure 79 (A, left) shows one run of this scenario.  Normally, each scenario is run multiple times 
in order to acquire three quality samples.  A coordinate grid is displayed to the right (B) to help 
illustrate the location of each node as well as the start and end point of the jammer.  Note that 
only the jammer is mobile.  Since there is no flow control within the attenuator control program, 
each time the scenario is run it can last between 85-90 seconds.  Therefore, each scenario was 
executed multiple times in order to provide at least three quality samples with similar elapsed run 
times (less than 3 seconds variation). 
Notice that as the throughput between one link (two radios) decreases, the throughput between 
another link will increase.  This indicates contention between each node as they compete for 
resources on the channel.  Noted on Figure 79 (A) at 40 seconds is a drop in throughput between 
all radios.  This indicates the effective range of the jammer.  In order to validate that the nodes 
are within this range, consider the following explanation.  At 40 seconds, the jammer has moved 
40/90 seconds = 44% of the total distance of 185 m, which is around 82 m from the starting 
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point.  This location is 7-10 m from Rx 1 and Rx 2.  When factoring in FSPL, these distances 
translate to 57 to 60dB.  Since the signal power at each receiver is approximately -50dBm, the 
SJR at these locations is 7dB to 10dB.  Refer to Figure 80 for a more precise, graphical 
explanation. 
 
Figure 80: Correlation between Jammer attenuation (distance) and Throughput between nodes for Digital Jammer in 
Equidistant Node Topology. Total Network Throughput vs. Time (A), Attenuation vs. Time of programmable attenuators (B), 
Throughput vs. SJR of Digital Jammer in previous PHY layer experiment (C). 
Figure 80 (A) shows the sum of throughput between each radio over time (Purple).  Note that 
throughput declines around 39 seconds and recovers around 50 seconds.  Figure 80 (B) displays 
the programmable attenuator values over time between each radio and the jammer.  The 
attenuation at 39 and 50 seconds are marked at 9 and 14dB respectively.  Only the lowest two 
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attenuator values are marked; this is because if two radios are jammed, the total network is 
considered unavailable.  During this 11 second period, the jammer is considered to be < 15dB 
from the radio nodes.  According to previous PHY layer results in Figure 74, total throughput 
during this period is expected to be from 0 to 5 Mbit/sec.  When comparing these values to 
Figure 80 (C), it is easy to see at 39 - 50 seconds the jammer has reached its effective range of 0-
15dB, and throughput has ceased.  Figure 81 displays the same Equidistant scenario with a pulse 
jammer. 
 
 
Figure 81: Equidistant node topology in a mobile environment: Throughput vs. Time (A), and Coordinate Grid of Radios and 
Jammer (B).  A Pulse jamming node passes between three clients (Rx 1, 2, 3) that are equally spaced (15 meters from each 
node). 
The only variation in this experiment is the substitution for a Pulse jammer.  The first data point 
in Figure 81 (A) indicates high throughput from Rx 2 to Rx 3 (Green).  When starting the 
experiment, the first node will attempt to transmit while no other clients are on the network.  
This contention free period allows high throughput, but is short-lived.  In Figure 81 (A) 
throughput decreases in the following order: Rx 2, Rx 1, Rx 3.  This has a correlation to the 
proximity of the jammer as it reaches these nodes in the same order.  Nodes recover in a similar 
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pattern as the jammer leaves the vicinity with Rx 1 receiving the first transmission, although one 
would expect Rx 2 to recover first. 
To show an effective drop in network throughput the pulse jammer had been modified to 
transmit approximately 75% of the time.  The exact value in Mbit/sec was not previously 
recorded in the PHY layer experiments; however the expected value is between 1.0 - 3.8 
Mbit/sec at 0 SJR.  In Figure 82 we examine the correlation between the total network 
throughput and the jammer’s effective range. 
 
Figure 82: Correlation between Jammer attenuation (distance) and Throughput between nodes for Pulse Jammer in 
Equidistant Node Topology. Total Network Throughput vs. Time (A), Attenuation vs. Time of programmable attenuators (B), 
Throughput vs. Pulse Length vs. Pulse Period of Pulse Jammer in previous PHY layer experiment (C). 
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In terms of throughput over time the pulse jammer in Figure 82 (A) shows similar behavior to 
the Digital jammer, although throughput (Teal) never totally reaches zero.  Noticeable declines 
in throughput are marked starting at 39 seconds, ending at 50 seconds.  Figure 82 (B) indicates 
the attenuation settings for these two points: 9 and 14dB respectively.  Although no tests were 
conducted to measure the SJR range of pulse jamming, the results are within expectations; total 
network throughput briefly touches below 1 Mbit/sec.   
A single sine wave swept across the entire Wi-Fi band (100MHz) every two seconds acts as the 
jammer in the following experiment.  Two second sweeps were selected against the more 
successful 20 second sweeps due to the short duration of the mobile scenarios; 20 second sweeps 
could miss the effective range of each radio node entirely.  In the same topology and SJR as the 
previous experiment, a swept jammer has moderate impact on throughput.  Figure 83 (A) shows 
throughput over time, and (B) indicates node and jammer positions on a grid. 
 
Figure 83: Equidistant node topology in a mobile environment: Throughput vs. Time (A), and Coordinate Grid of Radios and 
Jammer (B).  A Sweep jamming node passes between three clients (Rx 1, 2, 3) that are equally spaced (15 meters from each 
node). 
Although the sweep jammer is not as effective as digital or pulse signals, there is a noticeable 
decrease in throughput every two seconds.  A peculiar result is shown in Figure 83 (A), where 
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the throughput from Rx 3 to Rx 1 (Blue) remains higher for most of the test period, despite the 
jammer’s proximity to those nodes.  Yet, this increase is not reflected among other scenarios and 
suggests that the problem is not likely an error with path-loss calibration, but perhaps simply a 
temporary increase in throughput. 
Figure 84 (A) demonstrates the correlation between expected throughput when the jammer is 
closest to each node.  At first glance, Figure 84 (A) does not match the throughput shown in (C); 
previous experiments show that the maximum throughput between 0 and 10dB SJR is between 
2.8 – 2.84 Mbit/sec.  However, the previous experiment in Figure 72 used a transmit rate of 3.5 
Mbit/sec, whereas the current mobile experiment transmits at 11 Mbit/sec.  To account for this 
change, the previous experiment was repeated between two radios at the desired 0-10dB SJR.  
The results are in agreement; throughput between two radios was averaged to 4.72 – 4.66 
Mbit/sec [Figure 84 (C)], and the total network throughput in Figure 84 (A) hover around these 
values between 33 and 57 seconds. 
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Figure 84: Correlation between Jammer attenuation (distance) and Throughput between nodes for Sweep Jammer in 
Equidistant Node Topology. Total Network Throughput vs. Time (A), Attenuation vs. Time of programmable attenuators (B), 
Throughput vs. Sweep Time vs. SJR of Sweep Jammer in previous PHY layer experiment (C). 
The sweep jammer seems to affect the network at a much higher SJR (in other words, from a 
larger distance) than the digital and pulse jammer.  Previous tests indicate this difference as well.  
The experiment in Figure 72 (A) shows no direct impact on throughput (Orange) at 10dB SJR, 
yet the experiment in Figure 72 (B) shows a modest 17% reduction in throughput.  This 
reduction is congruent in the mobile scenario, where the average throughput without a jammer is 
~ 5.7 Mbit/sec, and in close proximity to the jammer the throughput is ~ 4.7 Mbit/sec.  These 
results confirm expected values when introducing the mobile platform. 
The hidden node topology was chosen as a scenario to examine the impacts of jamming a 
network that relies on the CSMA/CA protocol.  To create a hidden node, the most distant nodes 
must not be able to communicate.  Keeping the signal levels at the receiver within the -50dBm 
target range required a virtual separation of each node by 15 m.  Normally, Rx 1 and Rx 3 can 
communicate with each other at a distance of 30 m, thus their link was separated manually.  This 
is accomplished by disconnecting the cables between the attenuators and couplers of Rx 1 and 
Rx 3, and terminating those connections with 50 Ω.  With this method, each receiver maintains 
the target signal level of approximately -50dBm, but Rx 1 and Rx 3 must rely on RTS/CTS 
handshakes to establish a connection with Rx 2.   
Additionally, we used the wireless configuration utility in the Gumstix radio to confirm Rx 1 
could not communicate with Rx 3.  The Gumstix occasionally reported a signal level of -80dBm, 
and other times did not report any signal at all.  The appearance of a signal when the connections 
are terminated may indicate a leak of Wi-Fi radiation through the shielded boxes or by coupling 
through the power cables.   
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Figure 85: Hidden node topology in a mobile environment: Throughput vs. Time (A), and Coordinate Grid of Radios and 
Jammer (B).  A Digital jamming node passes between three clients (Rx 1, 2, 3) that are spaced apart laterally as to emulate a 
hidden node (Rx 1 and Rx 3 cannot communicate with each other).   
Since Rx 3 cannot communicate with Rx 1, their throughput is not shown in Figure 85 (A).  We 
observed normal behavior of RTS/CTS contention on the network.  The jammer affects 
throughput at roughly the same time intervals as the equidistant node experiment (39 to 50 
seconds).  It is also shown that the link between Rx 2 to Rx 3 breaks and recovers before Rx 1 to 
Rx 3, which agrees with expectations that the jammer will first affect nodes closest to it, and 
those nodes will also be the first to recover as the jammer moves further away. 
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Figure 86: Hidden node topology in a mobile environment: Throughput vs. Time (A), and Coordinate Grid of Radios and 
Jammer (B).  A Pulse jamming node passes between three clients (Rx 1, 2, 3) that are spaced apart laterally as to emulate a 
hidden node (Rx 1 and Rx 3 cannot communicate with each other).   
This experiment exhibits a shorter jamming duration, with throughput recovering more quickly 
than with digital jamming.  As the jammer approaches around 36 seconds, there is a noticeable 
separation in throughput between Rx 2 to Rx 3 (Green) compared to the link from Rx 1 to Rx 2 
(Red).  This effect is seen in all hidden node scenarios and shows that even though the jammer is 
only 3 meters closer to Rx 3 than Rx 1, it appears to have an impact on the network.  
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Figure 87: Hidden node topology in a mobile environment: Throughput vs. Time (A), and Coordinate Grid of Radios and 
Jammer (B).  A Sweep jamming node passes between three clients (Rx 1, 2, 3) that are spaced apart laterally as to emulate a 
hidden node (Rx 1 and Rx 3 cannot communicate with each other).   
We observed an increased range of performance when using a Sweep waveform; notice the 
periodic drop in throughput in Figure 87 (A) is evident beginning around 30 seconds, which is 
around 10 seconds earlier (~20 m ahead), where the link is also slow to recover.  The sweep 
jammer may be able to disturb MAC layer protocols more effectively than other waveforms, 
which would explain its ability to affect throughput at a greater distance. 
Preparation for a distant node scenario is similar to the hidden node experiment in that the link 
between the two furthest nodes is broken; in this case, Rx 3 to Rx 1.  The connection between the 
programmable attenuators and couplers between Rx 1 and Rx 3 were left untouched with a 50 Ω 
termination from the hidden node experiment. 
In Figure 88 (A) it is clear that the jammer affects Rx 3 (Green) within the first 10 seconds.  The 
throughput received at Rx 2 (Red) reaches only 5 Mbit/sec of the typical maximum 5.8 Mbit/sec.  
This virtual ceiling may be due to the overhead of attempted retransmissions of Rx 2 while Rx 3 
is unavailable, in combination with a longer distance (thus, smaller data rate).  Figure 93 
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indicates a reduced maximum throughput between all hidden and distant node scenarios, which 
seem to support this theory. 
 
Figure 88: Distant node topology in a mobile environment: Throughput vs. Time (A), and Coordinate Grid of Radios and 
Jammer (B).  A Digital jamming node passes between three clients (Rx 1, 2, 3); Rx 3 is isolated and can only communicate 
with Rx 2 from a longer distance. 
There is a noticeable loss in throughput between Rx 1 to Rx 2 (Red), and an increase in 
throughput between Rx 2 to Rx 3 (Green).  This is likely due to the sudden availability of Rx 3 
as the jammer is not within effective range of any node, followed by a loss in throughput at node 
Rx 2.  As expected, the link between Rx 2 to Rx 3 recovers before the link between Rx 1 to Rx 2 
(at approximately 61 seconds).   
Figure 88 (A) shows that the maximum throughput achieved by Rx 2 to Rx 3 is less than the 
throughput achieved by Rx 1 to Rx 2, which is also expected since throughput decreases with 
distance.  However, the results of the next experiment conflict with this theory; the data rate 
between both links average out towards the end of the test, shown in Figure 89 (A). 
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Figure 89: Distant node topology in a mobile environment: Throughput vs. Time (A), and Coordinate Grid of Radios and 
Jammer (B).  A Pulse jamming node passes between three clients (Rx 1, 2, 3); Rx 3 is isolated and can only communicate with 
Rx 2 from a longer distance. 
Figure 89 (A) shows different behavior from the beginning of the experiment.  These differences 
are subtle; refer to Figure 93 for a clearer comparison between jamming techniques.  We 
observed a similar contention point at 41 seconds, although it appears as though the signal from 
Rx 1 to Rx 2 (Red) is strong enough to dominate the spectrum.  At about 60 seconds, we notice 
that the link from Rx 1 to Rx 2 breaks down, but quickly recovers while the link from Rx 2 to Rx 
3 is delayed, unlike the digital jammer in Figure 88 (A).  This may be due to the weakness of the 
pulse jammer to effectively prevent Rx 1 from communicating with Rx 2.   
Additionally, throughput averages out between both links to the same value of 2.5 Mbit/sec after 
75 seconds, unlike Figure 88.  The fact that both links can achieve equal throughput suggests that 
Rx 3 is not far away enough to lose a contention for resources.  The next experiment involves a 
sweep jammer in the same distant node topology. 
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Figure 90: Distant node topology in a mobile environment: Throughput vs. Time (A), and Coordinate Grid of Radios and 
Jammer (B).  A Sweep jamming node passes between three clients (Rx 1, 2, 3); Rx 3 is isolated and can only communicate 
with Rx 2 from a longer distance. 
The effectiveness of a sweep jammer at these specifications is questionable (100MHz sweep 
range of a 22MHz channel).  However, we do notice some effect from the sweep jammer at a 
very early stage.  This is in agreement with our experimental results, as the sweep jammer 
achieves a 15% reduction in throughput from only 10dB SJR, it is likely to have a smaller effect 
from 15-20dB SJR.   
An interesting point of this graph is the reduction in throughput at the receiver of Rx 2, yet no 
reduction at Rx 3.  Even though the jammer reaches the same proximity to all nodes, it is not 
powerful enough to decrease throughput beyond 2.5 Mbit/sec, and since Rx 3 is already limited 
in throughput (from a distance), the jammer has little effect on this node.  Compared to other 
techniques, each jammer’s performance is varied, as shown in Figure 91.   
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Figure 91: Comparison of performance among different jamming techniques in a mobile, Equidistant node topology. Graph 
of Total Network Throughput vs. Time of Digital, Pulse, and Sweep jamming. 
Digital jamming (Purple) clearly shows improved performance over the Pulse (Teal) and Sweep 
(Orange) methods.  Maximum throughput matches results from previous experiments: around 
5.7-5.8 Mbit/sec average without presence of a jammer.  Pulse jamming results also agree with 
results taken from previous experiments: nearly 1 Mbit/sec at close range of the jammer.  A 
sweep tone with a range only across channel 1 of Wi-Fi 802.11b/g may show increased 
performance and perhaps the ability to interfere with enough packets to cause a disconnection or 
disassociation between nodes. 
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Figure 92: Comparison of performance among different jamming techniques in a mobile, Hidden node topology. Graph of 
Total Network Throughput vs. Time of Digital, Pulse, and Sweep jamming. 
Total throughput in Figure 92 is approximately 5 Mbit/sec, compared to 5.8 Mbit/sec in the 
Equidistant node topology.  The reduction in throughput may be due to the added overhead when 
relying on a middle node.  The sweep jammer seems to have less of an effect, but a wider range 
of variability; another indication of its ability to affect communications with high SJR, most 
likely by affecting the MAC layer. 
However, since the two radio testbed results of sweep tone jamming are similar to results 
produced by Harjula et. al., indicating an effect with an SJR < 10dB, the values shown in Figure 
92 remain an undefined anomaly of the four radio testbed as it suggests a range of SJR > 10dB. 
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Figure 93: Comparison of performance among different jamming techniques in a mobile, Distant node topology. Graph of 
Total Network Throughput vs. Time of Digital, Pulse, and Sweep jamming. 
From Figure 93, we see a definitive separate in performance from sweep jamming, but the digital 
and pulse techniques show a split in performance at two intervals.  At 21 seconds and 73 seconds 
the effectiveness of the digital and pulse jammers alternate, implying that a Pulse jammer is more 
effective against distant nodes from greater than 10 meters, but a Digital jammer is more 
effective at closer ranges.   
Overall we observed mostly predictable behavior with a few discrepancies.  It was predicted and 
later verified that the mobile jammer would affect the radio nodes according to its effective range 
derived from the PHY layer experiments.   However, even though we used different software 
(substituted GNURadio for MATLAB) in the digital jamming experiment, we did not expect 
such a dramatic increase in effective range (6-7dB).  This was explained and confirmed in Figure 
74 and Figure 75 by the increase in bandwidth of signals produced by GNURadio as opposed to 
MATLAB.   
It was unexpected to see a slight increase in performance of sweep and digital jamming.  
Although, these gains could be explained by the addition of shielded boxes and the placement of 
copper tape along power cables in the four radio testbed (the previous two radio testbed had no 
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shielding over the Gumstix) which help to reduce Wi-Fi radiation and consequently prevent 
signals from bypassing the jammer, but this does not explain the decreased performance of pulse 
jamming. 
4.2.1 MAC Layer Mobile Jamming 
We began testing the theory that repeated beacons would have an impact on network throughput.  
Approximately four seconds of typical beacon traffic between three nodes was captured using 
GNURadio and the USRP.  This data was then played back into a wireless card connected to a 
computer with Linux: Backtrack.  A tool called “horst” (Highly Optimized Radio Spectrum 
Tool) confirmed that the packets being transmitted were legitimate.  Additionally, we observed 
the iwconfig utility on one single wireless node (unconnected to any network) which reported a 
valid connection.  This means that the process of recording and play-back of the wireless beacon 
traffic was being correctly received. 
Traffic was recorded when all three nodes were using WEP encryption and a 1 Mbit/s data rate.  
Then, the network was modified to use no encryption and a 54 Mbit/s rate.  We observed an 
impact on throughput when this recording was played back into the network within a maximum 
range of 15-20dB SJR.  However, we also transmitted pulsed noise designed to mimic the 
wireless traffic but did not contain any useful information, and this had the same impact on 
throughput.  This means that the replayed beacons had the same impact as pulsed noise, and 
suggest that the network is not affected by malicious beacon traffic. 
On the contrary, it may be that the wireless nodes are rejecting these beacon packets as they are 
not properly synced with their own beacons.  Unfortunately, due to time constraints our team 
was not able to completely explore the “reactive” portion of this experiment.  We did find that 
the Wireshark tool was not able to display management frames, and was not fast enough to 
support reliable predictions of beacon traffic.  In the future we would suggest aligning fake 
beacon traffic to occur directly before or after the target’s beacon, at which time the target would 
be more likely to accept the new information as it aligns with other beacons.  This could be 
implemented using UHD tools instead of GNURadio, which would offer a much faster response 
time. 
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5 Conclusions and Future Work 
The RF channel emulator designed, built, and tested in this project provided a suitable testing 
platform for PHY layer jamming techniques on a mobile configuration of radios.  Results from 
testing and validation indicate that the testbed is functional and representative of a simplified RF 
channel.  In addition, results from the mobile PHY layer jamming experiments suggest that the 
testbed is a viable platform for investigating jamming methods and techniques.  Its mid-range 
price tag achieves an economical balance between the high fidelity of hardware systems and the 
repeatability of wireless channel emulators.  The demonstration of the MAC layer attack was 
unsuccessful; a repeated beacon signal did not seem to have an effect on network performance, 
however this topic was not fully explored.  Finally, while the testbed served the purposes and 
scope of the project, the team has identified several improvements and alterations that could 
increase accuracy and robustness.  In this chapter, key conclusions will be described followed by 
areas identified for additional work and development.  
The tests on various components and the system as a whole indicated that the testbed designed 
and built over the course of this project meets specifications and is fully functional.  As 
originally defined, key specifications for the testbed included attenuator switching speed less 
than 1 ms, isolation greater than 20dB between different paths, less than 45dB loss through the 
system, and no greater than 2dB of variation in loss between those paths.  As shown in the results 
and discussion chapter, these specifications have been met. 
In general, the channel emulator performed to specification based upon testing.  It also 
performed well in the validation testing done.  In order to verify the functionality of the channel 
emulator, the team repeated some stationary PHY layer experiments from a publication by 
Harjula e.al [7] and compared results.  When results were compared with this published research, 
the team findings contained an acceptable amount of error which could otherwise be explained 
by the substitution of equipment and software.  This served as a validation of the channel 
emulator, confirmed testing procedure, and provided a benchmark for future mobile scenarios.   
Our research into the performance and effects of various jamming techniques in a mobile 
environment produced expected results; in most scenarios, digital jamming remains the most 
effective against 802.11 receivers, compared to pulse and sweep jamming.  Yet, these findings 
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are preliminary.  Additional research using wireless cards that offer enhanced control and 
flexibility (for instance the ability to definitively control modulation, data rate, transmit power, 
and MAC layer controls) would allow for selective tests that target specific layers of the 802.11 
protocol and could help to answer how each technique affects communications while moving. 
While the team did not ultimately have enough time for any conclusive testing on the MAC layer 
beacon frame attack, some preliminary testing was completed.  The ‘reactive’ portion of the 
technique was found to be challenging due to timing limitations, so beacons were instead 
replicated without precise timing.  The team found that replicating a client’s beacon frame using 
false encryption and data rates did not severely affect network performance.  A noticeable drop 
in throughput was observed, but this is likely correlated to collisions from transmitting beacon 
packets.  It is possible that other nodes on the network are rejecting these false packets.  Future 
work in this area could implement a truly reactive beacon to confirm this theory. 
Although the channel emulator met testing requirements for this project, there are several steps 
that could be taken to improve its utility as a long term test asset.  For example, although the 
channel emulator is designed to support testing from 2 to 8GHz, it is only calibrated for the Wi-
Fi band.  Extending calibration over the entire band would make the channel emulator useful for 
a wider variety of testing scenarios.  An even larger bandwidth could be supported if the 30MHz 
to 3GHz parts are added to the system as discussed in the methodology.  Some enhancements 
might also be added that could improve the range of mobile situations that can be represented on 
the channel emulator.  Currently, the channel emulator supports changing geometries where each 
node starts and ends at a specified location and moves between those two locations during the 
simulation in a straight line at a constant rate over a specified run time.  A more complicated 
scenario might involve motion beyond just a straight line.  More sophisticated MATLAB code 
would enable this type of experiment.  A GUI which prompts users for information regarding 
node placement and then generates corresponding graphic depicting the moving nodes might also 
improve the usability of the channel emulator. 
In addition to increasing the number of testing scenarios supported by the channel emulator, 
system durability and robustness could be improved with further work.  One potential area for 
improvement involves the attenuator driving mechanism.  In the current setup, the attenuators are 
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driven by an NI PCI card connected to a breadboard through a breakout board.  An FPGA might 
offer cleaner signals and more flexibility.  The breadboard itself is not the best long term setup.  
Replacing that with a more permanent structure with soldered connections might reduce any 
problems due to the temporary nature of the high density pin connectors.  
In summary, the team constructed a functional, four node, 2 – 8GHz channel emulator calibrated 
over the Wi-Fi band.  This channel emulator was used to test a series of mobile jamming 
techniques in three different scenarios.  The team found that digital jamming shows an increased 
ability to negatively affect network performance when compared with pulse and sweep 
techniques, except in distant node topologies where pulse jamming displays better performance 
at a distance greater than 10 meters. 
Our increased reliance on wireless communications, especially in crowded public safety bands, 
underlies the importance of spectrum reallocation for use by emergency responders during a 
crisis.  The ability to utilize a calibrated, wireless, mobile test environment is critical to those 
who wish to alleviate the problem of congested networks.  We hope that continued development 
of flexible test platforms, such as the channel emulator described in this report, will contribute to 
effective re-establishment of communications by emergency responders and authorized 
personnel in the event of a natural disaster. 
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7 Appendix 
Table 10: List of 802.11 Standards [14]. 
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Figure 94: Effects on throughput from Digital Jamming.  Results from published work [7] (top), results from two node testbed 
(bottom).   
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Figure 95: Effects on throughput from Pulse Jamming.  Results from published work [7] (left), results from two node testbed 
(right).  
 
Figure 96: Effects on throughput from Sweep Jamming.  Results from published work [34] (left), results from two node 
testbed (right). 
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MATLAB Code: Calculate Programmable Attenuator Values 
function [ attenuation_values ] = calc_att(start_vector,... 
    stop_vector, duration_s ) 
%CALC_ATT This function consumes a start_vector(4,1) with imaginary number 
%components where the real part is the x location and the imaginary part is 
%the y location. Stop vector is the same. Duration is the number of ms the 
%experiment is meant to be run. 
 
 
 
duration_ms = (1.6667*duration_s)*1000; 
% figure out timing 
num_ms = round(duration_ms); 
time_vector = 0:1:(num_ms); %[ms] 
time_vector = rot90(fliplr(time_vector)); 
att_pad_dB = 50.5;%SUBJECT TO CHANGE, this is the value of the additional 
% attenuator pads in the system 
 
delta = stop_vector - start_vector; %[meters] 
velocity = delta./num_ms; %[meters/ms] 
freq = 2.4; %[GHz] 
position = ones(num_ms+1,4); %initialize 
for a = 1:1:4 
 
   position(:,a) = rot90( real(velocity(a))*time_vector +real(start_vector(a))... 
       + j* ( imag (velocity(a))*time_vector +imag(start_vector(a)))); 
end 
 
distance = ones(num_ms+1, 6); 
mult = [2 3 4 3 4 4; 1 1 1 2 2 3]; 
for b = 1:1:(num_ms+1) %rows-- num_ms 
 
    for c = 1:1:6 %columns-- specifies which column of mult to use 
     radioa = mult(1,c); 
     radiob = mult(2,c); 
     distance(b,c) = abs( position(b, radioa) - position( b, radiob) ); 
    end 
 
end 
 
distance; 
 
%attenuation_values = ones(num_ms, 6); %initialize 
attenuation_values6 = 20*log10(distance/1000) + 20*log10(freq) + 94.45; 
attenuation_values = ones(num_ms+1, 12); 
 
%fill matrix 
attenuation_values(:,1:3) = attenuation_values6(:,1:3); 
attenuation_values(:,4) = attenuation_values6(:,1); 
attenuation_values(:,5:6) = attenuation_values6(:,4:5); 
attenuation_values(:,7) = attenuation_values6(:,2); 
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attenuation_values(:,8) = attenuation_values6(:,4); 
attenuation_values(:,9) = attenuation_values6(:,6); 
attenuation_values(:,10) = attenuation_values6(:,3); 
attenuation_values(:,11) = attenuation_values6(:,5); 
attenuation_values(:,12) = attenuation_values6(:,6); 
 
 
 
attenuation_values = round((attenuation_values-att_pad_dB)*2)/2; 
%Plotting the changing geometry and attenuation settings: 
figure 
subplot(1,2,2) 
 
hold on 
grid on 
 
x = 0:1:1667; 
plot(x,(attenuation_values(:,3)), 'b') 
plot(x,(attenuation_values(:,6)), 'r') 
plot(x,(attenuation_values(:,9)), 'g') 
plot(x,(attenuation_values(:,1)), 'c') 
plot(x,(attenuation_values(:,2)), 'k') 
plot(x,(attenuation_values(:,5)), 'm') 
title('Att. setting btwn jammer & radios 1(b) 2(r) and 3(g)') 
ylabel('Attenuation between nodes [dB]'); 
xlabel('Time [s]'); 
set(gca, 'XTick', 0:187.4668:1668) 
set(gca, 'XTickLabel', {'0','10','20','30', '40', '50',... 
     '60',  '70',  '80', '90'}) 
xlim([0 1667]); 
hold off 
 
 
subplot(1,2,1) 
grid on 
xlabel('X Location [meters]'); 
ylabel('Y Location [meters]'); 
title('Radio1 (b) Radio2 (r) Radio 3 (g) Jammer (moving)') 
set(gca, 'YTick', -100:20:100) 
set(gca, 'YTickLabel', {'-100','-80','-60','-40','-20','0','20', '40', '60', '80' '100'}) 
 
% hidden node 
% xlim([-30 70]) 
% set(gca, 'XTick', -30:20:70) 
% set(gca, 'XTickLabel', {'-30','-10','10','30','50','70'}) 
 
% equidistant & distant node 
xlim([-40 60]) 
set(gca, 'XTick', -40:20:60) 
set(gca, 'XTickLabel', {'-40','-20','0','20','40','60'}) 
 
hold on 
scatter(7, 95, 1, 'y') 
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scatter(7, -95, 1, 'y') 
hold on 
scatter(real(position(:,1)),imag(position(:,1)), 100, 'b', 'filled') 
hold on 
scatter(real(position(:,2)),imag(position(:,2)), 100, 'r', 'filled'); 
hold on 
scatter(real(position(:,3)),imag(position(:,3)), 100, 'g', 'filled'); 
comet(real(position(:,4)),imag(position(:,4))) 
end 
 
MATLAB Code: Generate ASCII Characters 
function [] = gen_ascii3( attenuation_values ) 
%GEN_ASCII2 This function generates a matrix of ones and zeros to be sent 
%to 12 attenuators and writes to a txt file named 'writefile.txt' 
 
 
num_ms = length(attenuation_values(:,1)); 
% structure output matrix q 
% each att value takes up 24 rows of a four column matrix.Att val switches 
% every ms so: 
q = ones((24*num_ms),15); 
 
% initialize attenuation matrix, columns: C,R,L,S(12). Each attenuation 
% matrix sets one set of values for all twelve attenuators 
matrix = ones(24,15); 
    for n = 1:2:23 
        matrix(n,1)=0; 
    end 
matrix(1:20,3) = 0; 
matrix(3:4,2) = 0; 
 
%This loop sets up the matrix for each value and puts it into q at the 
%appropriate location 
for i = 1:1:num_ms 
 
    %intitialize att bits 
    attenuation_bits = ones(12,12); 
    for j = 1:1:12 %this loop sets the attenuation bits,goes down x axis 
      a = round(attenuation_values(i,j)*2); 
      binary_rep = dec2bin(a,6); 
      %binary_rep = str2num(dec2bin(  round(attenuation_values(i,j)*2) , 6 )) 
            for k = 1:1:6 %goes down the y axis of matrix filling in 
                l = 7-k; 
                b = not(str2num(binary_rep(l))); 
                attenuation_bits(  ((2*k)-1):(2*k), j  )= b; 
            end 
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    end 
 
    matrix(9:20,4:15) = attenuation_bits; 
 
    offset = ((i-1)*24)+1; 
    offset2 = offset+23; 
 
    q(offset:offset2,:) = matrix; 
 
end 
% below are modifications for the problems we had scaling up to support... 
% more attenuators, i.e. more clock, reset, and latch lines 
 
% out is new output[c c c r r r l l l s1-->s6 c c c r r r l l l s7-->s12] 
c = q(:,1); % clock 
r = q(:,2); % reset 
l = q(:,3); % latch 
filler = 0*l; %zeroes for pins that we don't use 
s16 = q(:,4:9); % serial lines for attenuators 1 through 6 
s712 = q(:,10:15); % serial lines for attenuators 7 through 12 
 
out = [c,c,c,r,r,r,l,l,l,s16,c,c,c,r,r,r,l,l,filler, s712,filler,l]; 
%Writes 'out' to writefile.txt 
dlmwrite('writefile.txt',out, ' ') 
 
end 
C Code: Write to NI-PCI Card 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <NIDAQmx.h> 
#include <sys/stat.h> 
#include <time.h> 
#define DAQmxErrChk(functionCall) if( DAQmxFailed(error=(functionCall)) ) goto Error; 
else 
#define Start_Delay 1 
 
char *load_buffer(char *argv[]); //This function creates a buffer of information 
// read from the text file 
 
char *load_buffer(char *argv[]) 
{   
        FILE * pFile; 
        long lSize; 
        static char *buffer; 
        size_t result; 
        int i=0; 
        pFile = fopen ( argv[1], "rb" ); 
        if (pFile==NULL) {fputs ("File error",stderr); exit (1);} 
 
        // obtain file size: 
        fseek (pFile , 0 , SEEK_END); 
        lSize = ftell (pFile); 
        rewind (pFile); 
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        // allocate memory to contain the whole file: 
        buffer = (char*) malloc (sizeof(char)*lSize); 
        if (buffer == NULL) {fputs ("Memory error",stderr); exit (2);} 
 
        // copy the file into the buffer: 
        result = fread (buffer,1,lSize,pFile); 
        if (result != lSize) {fputs ("Reading error",stderr); exit (3);} 
        /* the whole file is now loaded in the memory buffer. */ 
        return buffer; 
} 
 
 
 
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) // loops through the different lines of data writing 
them 
 // to the card one line at a time 
 
 // To use this program, type: 
 //   ./WriteDigChan_jeff file2write.txt -r 
 //   include -r if you want to write the file to the card on repeat 
{ 
 int32       error=0; 
 TaskHandle  taskHandle=0; 
 char        errBuff[2048]={'\0'}; 
 char Devstr[32] ; 
 int i; 
 int option_index = 0; 
 char str1[]="Dev2/port0/line0:31"; 
 strncpy(Devstr, str1, 32); 
 char *buf = load_buffer(argv);  
 sleep(Start_Delay); 
 DAQmxErrChk (DAQmxCreateTask("",&taskHandle)); 
 DAQmxErrChk (DAQmxCreateDOChan(taskHandle,Devstr,"",DAQmx_Val_ChanForAllLines)); 
 DAQmxErrChk (DAQmxStartTask(taskHandle)); 
 
 /*********************************************/ 
 // DAQmx Write Code 
 /*********************************************/ 
 uInt8 output[32]; 
 do 
 {  
  char* ptr = &buf[0]; 
  int temp_buffer[32]; 
  while(*ptr != '\0') 
  { 
          for (i=0;i<=31;i++) 
          { 
                  temp_buffer[i]=(int)(*ptr)-48; 
                  ptr++;  ptr++; 
    output[i]=(uInt8)temp_buffer[i]; 
  // printf("%i ", output[i]); 
          } 
  //printf("\n"); 
   DAQmxErrChk 
(DAQmxWriteDigitalLines(taskHandle,1,1,10.0,DAQmx_Val_GroupByChannel,output,NULL,NULL)); 
  } 
 int z; for (z=0;z<1000;z++){z=z;} // seems to suppress clock delay problems 
 } while(argc==3 && strcmp(argv[2],"-r") == 0); 
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Error: 
 if( DAQmxFailed(error) ) 
  DAQmxGetExtendedErrorInfo(errBuff,2048); 
 if( taskHandle!=0 )  
  DAQmxStopTask(taskHandle); 
 if( DAQmxFailed(error) ) 
  printf("DAQmx Error: %s\n",errBuff); 
 
 return 0; 
} 
 
======================================================== 
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Datasheet: Krytar Coupler 
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